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This thesis is going to describe the different ways the United States and Germany deal
with the problem of double taxation in the legal context of corporate distributions to its
shareholders in form of dividends. Tax law is particularly one of the areas of laws that is
subject to frequent and often substantial changes. This is true for the German as well as
for the U.S. taxlawS.
The U.S. corporate tax law treated this matter quite differently over the last 133 years.
1
The main feature of the present U.S. corporate tax law with regard to the treatment of
distributed dividends is the two tier tax structure, meaning that dividends are taxed on the
corporate level as well as on the shareholder level. Such tax treatment has caused a lot of
controversy among scholars. Most of them conclude that the present state of the U.S. law
violates the basic tax policy principles of equity and efficiency and therefore should be
reformed.
1
For an overview of the historical examples of the U.S. income and corporate tax see Scott A. Taylor.
Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future. 10
Va. Tax Rev. 237. 260-88 (1990). The Civil War income tax of 1864 taxed income of individuals and
certain enumerated corporations. As far as these corporations distributed dividends, such dividends were
exempt from the income tax at the shareholder level. The income tax law of 1894 imposed a flat tax of 2
% on individual income, also providing a general exemption of $ 4.000. Besides, all corporations were
now subject to a 2 % of their income without the allowance of a general deduction. Dividends paid to
individuals were exempt from their tax base. From 1913 on, corporate income was taxed on the corporate
and the individual level. However, whereas corporations paid a flat tax rate on their earnings, individuals
paid both a flat rate 'normal' tax and a progressive rate additional' tax on their income Dividends were
not included in the individual 'normal' tax. which led to the result that corporate income did not bear a
substantially greater tax burden than non-corporate income. The Revenue Act of 1936 allowed
corporations to deduct distributed dividends from their income. From 1939 on, the U.S. corporate tax law
provided for the first time that distributed corporate income was subject to the corporate level tax as well
as the shareholder level tax. To mitigate the double taxation effect. Congress provided in 1954 the
individual shareholder with a 4 % credit for dividends received and that the first fifty dollars were allowed
as a general exclusion. Congress repealed the credit in 1968 and, instead, increased the allowed deduction
to one hundred dollars. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly increased the corporate and income tax
burden on distributed dividends.
2
The main feature of the German corporate tax law with regard to dividends is the
imputation procedure, meaning that shareholders are allowed to use the corporate level
tax as a credit against their individual income tax liability. This imputation procedure was
implemented by the Corporate Tax Reform of 1977. Preceding the reform, for several
years scholars discussed the pros and cons of the double taxation issue and the necessity
of reforming the system. Ten years after the reform, scholars evaluated the change in law
and commented on how far the tax reform succeeded in fulfilling its objectives.
Since some of the issues being discussed in the United States today in connection with
the corporate tax law are similar if not identical to the issues discussed in Germany before
the tax reform, the purpose of this thesis is to describe the impact and effects the tax
reform had on the corporate tax law in Germany After stating the results of the tax
reform, the thesis determines whether or not the suggestions raised by the legal literature
to improve the U.S. tax system with regard to the policy principles of equity and efficiency
are likely to be successful
The second chapter of the thesis introduces the reader to the tax principles of equity
and efficiency, since these principles set the standards for the evaluation of the tax
provisions The third chapter describes in its first part the history and the present state of
the U.S. tax law with regard to the distribution of dividends. The second part of the
chapter explains the corresponding issues under the German tax law The fourth chapter
describes first the adverse and supporting criticism that is expressed in the ongoing
discussion about double taxation in the United States. Afterwards, the thesis addresses
whether the results of the German tax reform met its original objectives. Partly because of
the experiences gained in connection with the German tax reform and partly because of
convincing supporting criticism expressed in the discussion in the United States, the thesis
is going to conclude the following:
First, a tax reform that exclusively repeals the two level taxation of distributed
dividends is not going to substantially improve the tax system with regard to the equity
3
and efficiency principles Second, adverse criticism of double taxation focuses entirely on
the legal aspects of the equity and the efficiency principles without taking the economic
requirement into account that the tax system has to raise a certain amount of revenue.
Thus the conclusion of the legal literature that the repeal of the double taxation is going to
lead to a more equitable and efficient tax system is not based on a comprehensive
consideration of all the circumstances and is therefore highly debatable.
II. Principles of Taxation in General
A. Why is There Taxation?
As one of the major issues of social and economic policy, taxation serves generally the
purpose to enable the public sector to raise revenue
2
from the private sector (the tax
payer)" which is needed to finance the governmental tasks The modern state finances its
expenditures by raising revenue through taxation Thus taxation is the basis of a state's
ability to execute its functions. These functions include the preservation of peace among
its citizens as well as providing conditions which enable people to build an operating
society. Part of the government's share in this process is "to pay public employees needed
to provide social goods and services
,r
* By claiming the responsibility for these functions,
taxation became the centerpiece for a state's capacity to execute power.
5
Moreover, taxation serves the additional purpose as an instrument to intently influence
people's economic decisions. By implementing tax incentives, tax law can be used as a
device to encourage the taxpayer to act in a specific way. By taxing certain transactions
and by relieving from taxation other transactions, to a certain extent legislation
: Michael D. Rose. John C. Chonimie. Federal Income Taxation, at 1 (3
rd
ed 1988): Paul R.
McDaxieletal.. Federal Income Taxation, at 52. (1994).
3
Joseph A. Pechman. Fiscal T.ax Policy. 5th ed. 1987. at. 5.
4
Richard A Musgraye. Peggy B. Musgraye. Public Finance In Theory And Practice. 248 (4th
ed.. 1984).
5
E.W. Boeckentoerde. Extstehu\gdesStaatesals]'orgaxgderSaekularisieru\g. [Evolvement of a
State as a Process of Secularization] in Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. [State. Society. Freedom] 42
(1976).
5





that comes along with every tax.
These two purposes of the taxation illustrate its enormous importance.
Today, the state's justification to raise revenue in form of taxation is no longer in
doubt.
8
The United States Constitution explicitly grants the power to tax to the federal
government. Article 1, Section 8, clause 1 in connection with the 16
th Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States warrants the imposition of an income tax.
B. How Should Taxation be Executed?
A current tax system is always the temporary result of economic, political , and social
influences. There is not a flawless tax system "constructed by a master architect in line
with the optimal requirements for a 'good' tax structure."
9
Although federal tax law
changes quite frequently, certain basic tax structures are not altered because they conform
with generally accepted principles and norms.
10
These principles are laid out in two group
of norms, the "fairness norms" (or "equity norms) and the "economic norms".
11
These
norms differ in their effect: Fairness norms have an direct impact on people, whereas








Id., (the authors contend that federal income tax is far from a neutral, revenue raising device; it has a
profound impact on what people do").
8
This is not as self-evident as it might seem today. In the 18
th
century, the French philosopher and writer
Jean Jaques Rousseau broadly criticizes the concept of taxation in general. He contends that in a country
where individuals serve rather with their pocket book instead of rendering primarily personal services, the
decline of such a country is inevitable. He concludes that the word "tax'" is a slave word and that in a truly
free country its citizens do everything themselves and nothing with money. See JeanJaquesRousseau,
Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag, 1762 [The People's Contract], at 102 (reprinted 1977).
9 Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 4. at 224.
10





From an idealistic point of view, "fairness" or "equity norms" seek a "'correct'
distribution of wealth or income among people in society" n On the other hand,
"economic norms" aim towards economic efficiency, "which refers to aggregate
maximization of wealth and income without regard to distribution of that income or
wealth in society".
14
Other criteria to evaluate a tax system are eg the degree of
complexity and the degree of enforcement difficulty. In this overview of tax policy, there
is going to follow a closer look at the two major concepts, the "fairness norms" and the
"economic norms".
1. Fairness Norms
There are no controversies about the contention that as a matter of fairness people in
the same positions should be treated the same.
15
In the area of tax, this maxim is called the
concept of horizontal equity Persons in an alike position should bare the same tax
burden.
16
Somewhat accordingly, the maxim of vertical equity asks for a different
treatment of differently situated taxpayers This different treatment can be achieved by
simply applying a proportionate tax rate to the taxpayer's taxable income. By a matter of
calculation, the higher a person's taxable income, the higher his tax liability will be This
leads eventually to the different treatment A possibility to emphasize the effect of the
different treatment is to apply a progressive tax to the taxpayer's taxable income.
The effectiveness of the two policy principles horizontal and vertical equity depends on
one's determination of the tax base, i.e. what should be taxed.





Joseph M. Dodge. The Logic of Tax. at 88 (1989).
16
John Stuart Mill. Principles of Political Economy, at 804 (W.J. Ashley ed . London: Longmans.
1921) (Taxpayers are said to be treated equally if their tax payments involve an equal sacrifice of loss of
welfare); Dodge etal.. supra note 10. at 18.
17 Dodge etal.. supra note 10, at 19.
7
to choose "the most appropriate criteria by which to apportion the aggregate federal tax
burden among individuals "' 8 The following criteria are most commonly suggested
First there is the equal sacrifice principle
19
People should be taxed in equal amounts
since they benefit from the government equally. This might be true for general government
services like providing personal security through police forces and assuring basic civil and
political rights On the other hand, people with more property naturally receive a greater
portion of governmental services Therefore the prerequisite of "equal benefit" does not
exist.
Another criteria is the benefit principle, saying "that individuals should pay tax in
proportion to the varying benefits they receive from government."
20 On first glance, the
idea of taxing people in accordance to the advantages they take from governmental
services sounds reasonable
21
This is a special form of buying services from the
government However, there are governmental services for specific people (e.g. welfare
services) who are definitely unable to pay. Other governmental services (e.g. public
universities) are considered to create benefits not only to the recipient but at the same
time to the public as well In these situations, the benefit principle simply fails as a criteria
for an ideal tax base.
After the standard of living principle people would be taxed "according to their
standard of living, as evidenced by their level of personal consumption."
22
The weakness
of this principle is that it takes only people's consumption into account, whereas it does
not consider their savings
IS




Id. at 20; Musgraye & Musgraye. supra note 4.at 228.
:1
Id. at 20 (Tax payments are considered to be the quid pro quo for the governmental services)
"Mat 21.
The most comprehensive concept is the ability to pay principle.
2
' "Persons should
sacrifice the funds required for government operations according to the economic
resources - including both current income and accumulated wealth - under their control."
24
2. Economic Norms
The general idea of a functioning capitalist system is that of a free market Individuals
pursue their economic goals in a business environment with as few regulations as possible
The desired result is economic efficiency, which leads to the most possible maximization
of wealth and income.
25
The tax system with its burdensome regulations poses a threat to
this system. Therefore, "the fundamental free-market economic norm relevant to tax
systems and provisions is that of neutrality"' In theory, tax norms should as a
consequence neither encourage nor discourage individual's economic activities.
27
Neutral
taxes are those that have little or no effect on marketplace behavior
28 An efficient tax
does not influence the economic decision that taxpayers would make if there were no such
tax provision.
29
However, in reality there are hardly no tax provisions that do not affect
individual's decision-making.
30
23 As Musgrave points out. the ability to pay principle predates the benefit principle since it goes back to
the 16
th
century Supporters of this principle include social philosopher Rousseau and economist John
Stuart Mill, see Musgrwe & Musgrave. supra note 4. at 232.
24 Dodge et al.. supra note 10. at 21; Adam Smith combined the benefit and the ability to pay principle
in his first canon of taxation: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, that is. in proportion to the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state", see Adam Smith. The Wealth
of Nations at 310. (E Cannan ed.. vol. 2. 1904).





C. McLure. Must corporations be taxed twice. 253 (1979).
29
Jeffrey L. Kwall. The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation ofCorporate Income. 68
N.C.L.Rev. 613. 615 (1990); Musgrave and Musgrave. supra note 4. at 291-312.
30
Taxes might have a disincentive effect, called the substitution effect, when persons prefer low -taxed
actmty to higher taxed activity in spite of economic disadvantages; On the other hand, there might be the
incentive effect called income effect, causing persons to earn more income to reach a targeted after-tax
goal, see Dodge et .al.. supra note 10. at 22.
9
Moreover, there are exceptions to this principle The free market ideal does not always
lead to the desired consequences.'
1
Thus, tax law is used as a device to encourage or
discourage activities or investments to achieve particular social and economic goals where
the free market system is unlikely to succeed in achieving the goal of economic
efficiency.
32
3. Summary of the Above Discussed Tax Principles
Economists and social philosophers developed the idea of certain general principles
which can be considered essential requirements of a "good" tax system.
33
The most
important principles are the following:
1. The tax system should be equitable. Every taxpayer should carry an equal
burden with regard to financing the cost of government.
34
2. The implementation of taxes should have as little impact as possible on the
taxpayer's economic decisions in otherwise efficient markets.
35
3. Where the tax is mainly used as a regulatory device, e.g. by granting incentives
through preferential treatment of certain expenditures, again this should cause as
little as possible interference with the equity of the system.
36
4 The tax system should set the set the prerequisites for "the use of fiscal policy
for stabilization and growth objectives."
37
5. The administration of the tax system should be "fair and non-arbitrary".
38
31 One example for market failure is e.g. the formation of monopolies.
32 McDanielet al.. supra note 2. at 53 (Tax provisions may encourage investment in particular
economic activities or may encourage socially valuable activities like charitable contribution.)
33
Cite Adam Smith and J.S. Mill










In other words, the desirable requirements of a "good tax structure" ask for an
equitable, efficient and well administered tax system.
39
.19
Id. McDanielet al., supra note 2. at 53.
11
III. Taxation of Retained and Distributed Corporate Dividends
A. Introduction to Corporate Tax in the U.S.
1. History and Constitutional Issues
The United States Constitution today contains the following principle provisions
addressing the issue of taxation:
Article I, Section 8 Clause 1. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States, but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
Article I, Section 9, Clause 4. "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid, unless in Proportion to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed
to be taken."
40
Amendment XVI. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration
."
Congress' first and successful attempt to raise revenue by taxing income, rather than
relying on customs duties, was made during the Civil War to gather sufficient funds to
finance the military expenditures.
41
This legislation which applied to both corporate and
individual incomes turned out to be temporary.
In 1 894, Congress tried to reestablish the income tax. It implemented the Income Tax
Act of 1894, which again applied to corporate as well as individual income.
42
The
Supreme Court declared the tax as unconstitutional.
43
According to its reasoning, the tax
violated the Constitutional requirement that "direct" taxes on property be apportioned
among the states according to population since a tax on individuals' incomes from real
40 Now changed by the XVI. Amendment.
41
Act of June 30, 1864. 13 Stat. 223 (1864).
42
Income Tax Act of 1894. ch. 349. 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
12
estate and personal property was indistinguishable from a direct tax on the underlying
property.
44
Furthermore it held that the corporate provisions of the statute were
inseparable from the individual provisions and therefore also contradict the Constitution.
45
In 1909, under consideration of the Supreme Court ruling in the Pollock case,
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1909, regulating only the corporate income.
46
It
pointed out that corporations are neither taxed on their receipt of income from their
property nor on the franchises of the corporation. The Supreme Court agreed with
Congress, finding that the latest Revenue Act implemented not a direct tax but a
constitutional excise or indirect tax on the privilege of doing business in a corporate
capacity that was only measured by such income
47
:
"[T]he tax is imposed not upon the franchises of the corporation,
irrespective of their use in business, nor upon the property of the corporation,
but upon the doing of corporate or insurance business, and with respect to the
carrying on thereof, [...], that is, when imposed in this manner it is a tax upon
the doing of business, with the advantage which inhere in the peculiarities of
corporate or joint stock organizations of the character described."
48
This Supreme Court ruling dealt only with the aspect of doing business in a corporate
form, whereas is did not address the issue of passive income derived from property. The
question how far such income would be protected from being corporate taxable income by
the Supreme Court ruling in the Pollock case
49
did no longer arise since the
implementation of the XVI. Amendment in 1913. From that moment on, the United States
Constitution explicitly grants power to Congress to collect taxes on (corporate) incomes
from whatever source derived.
43
Pollock v. Farmers" Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
44





Revenue Act of 1909. ch. 6. 36 Stat. 11.
^ Douglas A. Kahn. Jeffrey S. Lehman. Corporate Income Taxation, 5 (4
th
ed. 1994); Jane G
Gravelle. The Corporate Income Tax: Economic Issues and Policy Options. 48 Nat'lTax J. 267 (1995).
48
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.. 220 US 107, 115-116 (1911).
49
Pollock v. Farmers" Loan & Trust Co.. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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2. Present State of the Corporate Tax and Income Tax on Dividends
50
The United States tax system contains a two-tier tax structure for income of
corporations and their shareholders' income The income of corporations is subject to the
corporate tax, since they are legal entities distinct from their owners
51
In case of
distributions by the corporation to the shareholder, the shareholder is subject to tax on
these after-tax profits of the corporation.
A separate corporate tax is necessary to avoid substantially different tax treatment of
businesses pursued as a sole proprietorships and businesses conducted in the form of a
corporation
52
According to the doctrine of realization, an individual's investment income
needs to be realized before it is included in the individual's taxable income.
53
If there was
no corporate level tax, a business conducted in the corporate form could reinvest all of its
profits tax free (no act of realization has been occurred) whereas the sole proprietorship
could only reinvest after-tax profits.
54
Such a disparity in the tax burden of the two types
of businesses would not comply to the tax policy goal of efficient tax statutes.
50 The law discribed under III. A. 2 refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended by the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993. The explanations deal with corporations that do not qualify to an S
corporation or that do not elect to be one, l.g. the C corporation, section 1361 (a) (2) IRC.
51 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 47. at 26, (The authors state that '[t]here is an inescapable appeal to the
straightforward notion that every separate entity that conducts a business should be taxed currently on its








a) The Corporation's Taxable Income
The calculation of a corporation's taxable income is similar to the one of individuals
Nevertheless, some significant differences exist The corporation's taxable income is
defined as its gross income minus allowable deductions, section 63 (a). Due to the nature
of a corporation, the allowable deductions are not identical to the deductions for
individuals A corporation cannot claim standard deductions, 53 and does not receive
personal exemptions.
56
With regard to capital losses (losses from sales or exchanges of
capital assets, sections 165 (f), 1211 (a)), for corporations such losses are only allowed to
the extent of gains from such sales or exchanges.
b) Tax Rates
There are different tax rates that apply to individuals and corporations
aa) Tax Rates on Individuals
The tax rates for individuals are stated in section 1 (a) to (d) Internal Revenue Code of
1986 as amended by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993. There are five different
rates, starting at 15 %, and going over 28 %, 31 %, and 36 % to 39 6 %. Depending on
whether the taxpayer files a joint return as a married individual or a surviving spouse
(subsection (a)), a return as the head of the household (subsection (b)) or as an unmarried
individual (subsection (c)) or whether the taxpayer files a separate return as a married
55
Section 63 (b) IRC reads: "[...] an individual who does not elect to itemize his deduction [...]"•
56
BabetteB. Barton etal. Taxation;of Business Enterprises 5 (17
th
ed. 1995) (Corporations are
inanimate separate entities that do not need food, shelter, medical attention and therefore may not claim
such deductions.)
15
individual (subsection (d)), the amounts of income change to which the five categories of
rates apply.
E.g., for the married individual filing a joint return, the five tax rates apply to the
following amounts of taxable income:
57
Not over $ 36,900 1 5 % of taxable income
Over $ 36,900 to $ 89,150 $ 5,535 plus 28 % of excess over $ 36,900
Over $ 89,150 to $ 140,000 $ 20,165 plus 31 % of excess over $89,150
Over $ 140,000 to $ 250,000 $ 35,928.5 plus 36 % of excess over
$ 140,000
Over $ 250,000 $ 75,528.5 plus 39.6 % of excess over
$ 250,000
In the order of heads of household, unmarried individual, and married individual
filing separate returns, the income tax burden increases gradually for these type of
taxpayers.
58
Tax law provides special treatment for long term capital gains or capital losses. Under
section 1 (h) IRC, long term net capital gain is taxed at a maximum rate of 28 % Section
1 (h) IRC simply caps the tax rates. This means that capital gain income realized by a
person otherwise taxed at 31 %, 36 % or 39.0 % is taxed at 28 %, whereas capital gain is
taxed at only 15 % if the taxpayer's remaining income is taxed at that rate.
Capital gains or losses result from a sale or transaction of a capital asset. Section 1 22
1
(1) to (5) IRC defines capital asset as property held by the taxpayer whether or not
connected with his trade or business except inventory, self-created art work, copyrights,
letters, notes, accounts receivable from the sale of inventory or services and under in
subparagraph (5) closer described circumstances publications of the United States
Government. The notion behind this special treatment is "that the concept of capital gain
and loss excludes gain and loss attributable to the sale of inventory and services, i.e.,
5
See section 1 (a) IRC.
58
For details see section 1 (b) to (d) IRC.
16
ordinary business and wage income."
59
Finally it is important to mention that section 121
1
IRC provides that capital losses may only be offset in the case of a corporation against
capital gams and in case of an individual against capital gams plus up to $ 3,000 of
ordinary income.
bb) Tax Rates on Corporations
Section 11 (b) IRC as amended by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 provides
the applicable tax rates on corporate income:
Not over $ 50,000 15%
Over $ 50,000 to $ 75,000 25 %
Over $ 75,000 to $ 100,000 34 %
Over $ 100,000 to $ 335,000 39 %
Amounts exceeding $ 100,000 up to $ 235,000 are taxed at 39 % due to
the phase out provision of section 11 (b) (1) last paragraph IRC This
provision phases out the benefit of the lower tax brackets of 1 5 % and
25 % for income up to $ 75,000.
Over $ 335,000 to $ 10,000,000 34 %
Over $ 1 0,000,000 to $ 1 5,000,000 3 5 %
Over $ 15,000,000 to $ 18,333,333 38 %
Amounts exceeding $ 15,000,000 up to $ 3,333,333 are taxed at 38 % due
to the phase out provision of section 11 (b) (1) last paragraph IRC. This
provision phases out the benefit of the lower tax bracket of 34 %
for income up to $ 10,000,000.
Over $ 18,333,333 35%.
Section 11 (b) (2) IRC provides an exception to paragraph (1) The income of
qualifiedpersonal service corporations as defined in section 448 (d) (2) IRC is taxed at a
flat rate of 35 % regardless of the amount of taxable income
Like individuals, corporations can also benefit from the lower tax rates in connection
with income from capital gain.
59 Dodge et AL.,supra note 10, at 37.
60
For explanation of taxation of income from capital gains, see supra III. A. 2. b) aa).
17
cc) Relationship Between Corporate and Individual Tax Rates
Throughout the history of the income tax and the corporate tax, the maximum
corporate tax rate was almost always significantly lower than the top individual tax rate
Therefore, individuals were tempted to "shift income from themselves to their
corporations in order to have the income taxed at the lower corporate rates"
61 To
discourage individuals from such actions, the Code contains under the headline of Subtitle
A, Chapter 1, Subchapter G "Corporations Used to Avoid Income Tax on Shareholders"
provisions regulating the personal holding company tax
6
' and the accumulated earnings
tax.
During the period from 1987 to 1992, the relationship of the top corporate and
individual tax rate was inverted.
64
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 restored the
former relationship, setting the top corporate rate at 35 % and the top individual rate at
39.6 %.
c) Distributions to Shareholders
aa) Statutory Pattern of Distributions
There are several possibilities for shareholders to receive their share of the corporate
earnings. The Code provides tax rules for different types of distributions from the
corporations to the shareholder as well as tax rules for the sale of stock. For the
shareholders, such income is either taxed as ordinary income or at the lower long term
capital gains rates. As a general rule, "current distributions are subject to ordinary income
61 Barton et al., supra note 56 r at 7
62
See sections 541 to 547 IRC.
63
See sections 531 to 537 IRC
64
The Revenue Code of 1986 provided for corporations a maximum tax rate of 34 % while the top tax rate
for individuals amounted to 28 %. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of1990 increased the individual rate
to 31%.
18
tax rates while many redemptions of stock, like the sale or exchange of stock, are taxed at
lower long-term capital gains rates."
65
Following is a brief overview of the IRC provisions
dealing with corporate distributions to shareholders:
The Code deals with liquidating distributions
66
in section 331 IRC, treating them like
distributions on the sale of stock. Section 336 IRC provides the tax consequences for the
corporation. Sections 332 and 337 IRC regulate the case if the shareholder is a
corporation which owns 80 % or more of the stock of the liquidating corporation,
extending non-recognition of gain or loss.
Redemption of the stock of the shareholder, i.e. a sale of the stock back to the issuing
corporation is either treated as a sale or as a current distribution. Sections 302; 303, 304
IRC govern the consequences on the shareholder side, whereas section 3 1 1 IRC regulates
the consequences on the corporate level.
For stock dividends, i.e the distribution by a corporation of its own stock, the question
is whether such distributions are taxable at all. This issue is addressed in sections 305; 306;
and 307 IRC.
A corporation may be used to shelter income from the individual's taxable income. An
individual in the top income tax bracket of 39.6 % could chose to conduct a business in
the corporate form for the only reason to reduce income taxes since the maximum tax rate
for corporations is 35 % at the moment. Congress decided that under certain
circumstances it is not suitable to use the corporate form to save income taxes. Especially
the sections 531 to 537 IRC
67
and 541 to 547 IRC
68
deal with the improper use of
corporations.
Finally there is the ordinary current distribution of property to the shareholder,
regulated under section 301 IRC. This kind of distribution is going to be discussed in the
65 Barton etal., supra note 56. at 141.
66
Section 331 (a) IRC defines such distributions as "[a]mounts received by a shareholder in a distribution
in complete liquidation of a corporation [...]".
6
This part of the IRC regulates the corporations improperly accumulating surplus.
68
This part of the IRC regulates the personal holding companies.
19
following paragraph, since it is the equivalent to the dividend distribution under German
corporate and income tax law that is subject to the imputation procedure
bb) Distribution of Property Under Section 301 IRC
Section 301 (a) IRC regulates a distribution of property made by a corporation to a
shareholder with respect to its stock The amount distributed is the amount of money
received plus the fair market value of the other property received.
69 An assumption of
liabilities in connection with the distribution reduces its amount ° The term property is
defined as money, securities, and any other property except stock in the corporation
making the distribution
71
The tax consequences of a section 301 IRC distribution depend on how much of the
distribution is considered to be a dividend Such portion is taxed as ordinary income ' A
dividend for tax purposes is defined in section 316 (a) ERC as "any distribution of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders" either out of its earnings and profits (e & p)
accumulated after February 28. 1913 '~ or out of its e & p of the taxable year This
indicates the existence of two e & p accounts, one for the accumulated and one for the
current earnings. In order to determine whether a distribution qualifies to be a dividend,
first current e & p is allocated ratably to all distributions made during the taxable year
without regard to the chronological order of the distribution
4
This is done at the end of
the year, while there was no diminution of the account by reason of any distributions made
during the taxable year If the distributions exceed the amount of the current e & p
69
Section 301 (b)(1) IRC.
70
Secnon 301 (b) (2) IRC
71
Section 317 (a) IRC
- Section 301 (c) (l)IRC.
3 The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on February 3. 1913 and became effective
February 25. 1913. This Amendment put aside any remaimng doubts about the income and corporate tax
being constitutional. Therefore, the date in section 316 IRC was chosen February 28. 1913. see Kahn&
Lehman, supra note 47 at 84.
4
See regulation 1.316-2 (b).
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account, to the extent of the accumulated account such remaining distributions are
qualified as dividends. For the accumulated account, there is no pro rata allocation but an
allocation according to the order of distribution.
If the corporation does not have sufficient e & p to cover the distribution, such
remaining amount does not qualify for dividend treatment Under section 301 (c) (2) IRC,
such a portion is treated as nontaxable return of capital to the extent of the basis for the
stock on which the dividend is distributed
75
In case the distributions also exceed such
basis, the surplus is treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property, section 301 (c)
(3) (A) IRC
The tax consequences for the corporation in case of a section 301 distribution depend
on whether the distribution is made in cash or in another form of property. A cash
dividend triggers no corporate tax consequences at all. Only the e & p account needs to be
reduced accordingly. If the corporation distributes property other than cash, section 3 1
1
(b) IRC provides that in case the fair market value of such property exceeds its adjusted
basis, the gain is recognized to the corporation On the other hand the Code disallows the
recognition of losses for distributed property, section 3 1 1 (a).
cc) Dividend Received Deduction for Corporate Shareholders
As described supra under III. A. 2., the IRC provides a two tier tax structure for
dividends distributed by a corporation to its shareholders. Generally, the corporation is
taxed on its income, and if all or a portion of this income is distributed to the shareholders
and qualifies for being a dividend under section 316 IRC, such a dividend is subject to the
shareholders income tax. If there were no modifications in case that the shareholder is also
a corporation (corporate shareholder), there would be possibly multiple tiers of taxation
5 Barton et al., supra note 56. at 143.
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before the ultimate individual owners of the business finally receive the dividend.
76
To
prevent the Code from burdening corporate earnings on three or more levels Congress
enacted section 243 IRC. Section 243 IRC does not entirely exempt dividends received
by corporate shareholders from their income. Such a rule could have the effect to
encourage individuals to hold their stock through closely held corporations (personal
holding companies) which rather reinvest than distribute the earnings and by doing so
indefinitely defer the shareholder-level tax.
77
Therefore section 243 IRC balances the
interest of preventing corporate earnings from possibly being taxed three or more times
with the interest to not enable shareholders to get rid of the shareholder-level tax by
constituting a personal holding company.
The general rule of section 243 IRC provides that in the case of a corporate
shareholder receiving dividends paid by a domestic corporation,
8
the recipient corporation
is allowed a deduction in the amount of a specific percentage of the distribution. The
percentage depends on the size of the interest the receiving corporation is holding in the
distributing corporation. If the receiving corporation owns 80 % or more of the voting
power and value of the stock of the payor corporation, it can take the entire amount of
the distribution as a deduction, sections 243 (a) (3) and (b); 1504 (a) IRC. The Code
provides another 100 % deduction for received dividends for small business investment
companies operating under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, section 243 (a) (2)
IRS
If the corporation owns an interest ratio of 20 % to less than 80 %, it is granted a 80 %
deduction of the distributed amount.
79
Such a deduction reduces the possible maximum






Section 7701 (a) (4) IRC defines a domestic corporation as one created in the United States or under
the law of the United States or of any State.
79
See section 243 (c) IRC.
80
Presuming the highest possible tax rate for corporations of 35 %. 35 % on 20 % of the dividend results
in a tax burden of 7 % for the entire distribution.
22
deduction". Corporations owning an interest of less than 20 % are allowed a deduction of
70 % of the distribution amount, leading to a possible maximum effective tax rate of 10.5
%. Accordingly, such a deduction is referred to as a "70 % dividend-received-
deduction".
These deductions are subject to certain statutory limitations. Section 246 (b) IRC
provides a ceiling for the aggregate amount of a corporate shareholder's "70 %" and "80
% dividend-received-deduction". The "80 % dividend-received-deduction" shall not
exceed 80 % of the corporate shareholder's taxable income "computed without regard to
the deductions allowed by sections 172, 243 ( a) (1), 244 (a), subsection (a) or (b) of
section 245 [,..]"
82
and some other deductions listed in section 246 (b) (1) IRC The
aggregate of the "70 % dividend-received-deduction" is restricted to 70 % of the
corporate shareholder's taxable income of the year. To determine the taxable income in
this context, the same calculation needs to be done as for the "80 % dividend-received-
deduction" and in addition the income is reduced by the aggregate amount of dividends
form 20 % owned corporations. 83 Therefore, generally the dividend-received-deduction
regulated under section 246 IRC are subject to a ceiling of either 70 % or 80 % of the
corporate shareholder's modified taxable income. Nonetheless, such restrictions do not




Presuming the highest possible tax rate for corporations of 35 %, 35 % on 30 % of the dividend results
in a tax burden of 10.5 %.
82
See section 246 (b) (1) IRC.
83
See section 246 (b) (3) (B) IRC.
84
It is significant that in order to determine whether there exists a net operating loss for the taxable year,
the corporate shareholder is allowed to use the entire amount of the 70 % and 80 %-received-deduction
without the limitations of section 246 (b) (1) IRC. see Treas. Reg. 1.246-2(b); See Kahn & Lehman,
supra note 47,at 77 (The authors illustrates in two examples when the corporate shareholder is allowed to
use the full dmdend-received-deduction or when the dividend-received-deduction is subject to the ceiling
of section 246(b) IRC).
23
d) Corporate Level Penalty Taxes
As described under III. A. 2. b) cc), the individual tax rates are significantly higher than
the tax rates for corporate taxpayers. Such a condition serves as an incentive "to use the
corporate form as a device for splitting or shifting income into lower brackets" to realize
substantial tax savings.
85
Moreover, the lower tax rates on long-term capital gain income compared to tax rates
on ordinary income encourages the choice to conduct business in a corporate form with
the objective of converting such ordinary income into long-term capital gain "through
liquidation of the corporation or through sale of its stock before a substantial amount of
the income from those business activity had been realized."
86
The Code provides in section 1202 IRC another favorable tax treatment in case of the
choice of the corporate form to conduct business. Under section 1202 (a) IRC, a taxpayer
other than a corporation can exclude 50 % of any gain attributable to the sale or exchange
of qualified small business stock held for more than 5 years Of course, this requires the
taxpayer to use a corporate form which complies with the provision of a qualified small
business under section 1202 (d) IRC Finally, the taxpayer can hold the stock until he
dies. As a consequence, the heirs receive the stock with a stepped-up basis, section 1014
(a) (1) IRC, thus sheltering the inherited gain from the shareholder level tax.
This examples show that the use of the corporate form can possibly be a means to
avoid the individual income tax on income as well as a means to convert ordinary income
into preferably taxed capital gain income. To battle these types of misuse, the IRC
contains provisions dealing with personal holding companies,
87
unreasonable
accumulations of income in a corporation,
88
and collapsible corporations.
85 Barton et al.. supra note 56. at 259.
86
Id.
8" See sections 541 to 547 IRC
88
See sections 53 1 to 537 IRC.
89
See section 341 IRC
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aa) Personal Holding Company Provisions
Under section 541 IRC, a personal holding company tax equals 39 6 % of the
undistributed personal holding income of a personal holding company. The tax rate of 39 6
% equals the maximum individual tax rate under section 1 IRC, thus eliminating the
advantage of being taxed under a lower corporate rate. There are two basic reasons for
the implementation of the personal holding company tax It shall discourage the use of the
corporate form first "as a tax receptacle for receiving and accumulation investment income
for the controlling shareholders",
90
and second "as a device for shifting to a separate
taxable entity income produced by personal services rendered by a talented controlling
shareholder."
91
A corporation is considered to be a personal holding company under two prerequisites:
The first prerequisite is that 60 % of its income must qualify as personal holding company
income as defined in section 543 IRC. Personal holding company income includes
generally dividends, interest, patent royalties, mineral royalties, copyright royalties,
annuities, and amounts received under personal service contracts performed by a
designated individual shareholder who at some time during the year owned 25 % or more
of the outstanding stock of the corporation Parts of the rents, interest, active business
computer software royalties and other royalties are excluded.
92
The second prerequisite
refers to the number of shareholders of the corporation. At any time during the last half of
the taxable year more than 50 % in value of its outstanding stock must be owned directly
or indirectly by or for not more than five individuals.
93
Section 542 (c) IRC excludes
90 Barton et al.. supra note 56. at 261. Kahn & Lehman, supra note 47. at 398. (The authors refer to
such a corporation as an incorporated pocketbook, serving the purpose 'to have the dmdend and interest





See section 543 (a) (1) through (5) IRC.
93
See section 542 (a) (2) IRC.
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certain types of corporations from the personal holding company provisions, e.g. banks,
savings and loan associations, life insurance companies, and some lending and finance
companies.
bb) Accumulated Earnings Tax
Sections 531 through 537 IRC deal with the accumulation problem.
94
Purpose of these
sections is to tax a corporation on its excessive accumulation of current earnings.
95
Section 531 IRC imposes an accumulated earnings tax equal to 39.6 % of the accumulated
taxable income on corporations "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the
income tax with respect to its shareholders [...] by permitting earnings and profits to
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed
"S6
Section 533 (b) states that holding
or investment companies are prima facie evidence of the purpose to avoid the income tax
avoidance with respect to shareholders. Again the rate of 39.6 % equals the maximum
individual tax rate
97
The rules do not apply to personal holding companies, foreign
personal holding companies and corporations exempt from tax.
98
If earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the
business, such accumulation is determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with
respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by a preponderance of the evidence can
prove to the contrary.
99
Under this statutory presumption it is necessary to determine the
reasonable needs of a particular corporation's business. Such a determination requires an
94 Kahn& Lehman, supra note 47. at 434 (The accumulation of retained earnings in a closely held
corporation lead to an increase in the value of the shareholder's stock. Since no dmdends are distributed,
there is no income tax on the shareholder level. To realize his share of the corporate earnings, the
shareholder can sell his stock in the following year or cause the liquidation of the corporation In both




See section 532 (a).
9
See explanation under III. A. 2. d) aa).
98
For further details see section 532 (b) IRC with additional references.
99
See section 533 (a) IRC
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evaluation of business judgments, and courts unlikely will challenge a businessman's
decision as long as there is a reasonable substantiation given.
100
However, a professional
corporation (like an incorporated law firm) will have difficulties to justify an accumulation
of income in excess of the minimum amount of accumulation permitted under section 535
(c) (2) IRC.
101
According to this section, an amount of $ 250,000 ($ 150,000 in the case
of certain personal service corporations)
102
can be at least accumulated without facing the
risk of being taxed under the accumulated earnings tax provisions. Section 537 (a) IRC
defines reasonable needs of the business as reasonably anticipated needs of the business,
section 303 redemption needs of the business and the excess business holdings redemption
needs of the business Treas. Reg. 1.537-2 (b) states some examples that if supported by
sufficient facts fulfill the requirements of being accumulated for the reasonable needs of
the business.
B. Introduction to Corporate Tax in Germany
1. History
a) Development of the Corporate Tax Law
Before 1920, there did not exist a uniform code regulating corporate taxation Until
then, this area was a matter of state law. The individual states regulated this issue in their
income tax codes. Generally, legal entities were taxed on their income as well as
individuals were. Due to the low tax rates, there was only little meaning to the existing
double burden on income.
103
100 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 47. at 437.
101
See Brumer. Moss & Cohen, P.A. v. United States, 37 AFTR 2d 76-802 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
102
The personal services have to be in the area of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting,
actuarial science, performing arts or consulting, see list in section 535 (c) (2) (B) IRC
103
The income tax code of Prussia from June 24, 1891 provided a maximum tax rate of 4 % on income
exceeding 100.000 Mark per year of. see Preuss. Ges. Sammlung at 175. The income tax code of Saxon
from July 2. 1878 contained a maximum income tax rate of 3 %, see Gesetz- und I 'erordnungsblatt at
27
The first uniform corporate tax code was implemented on March 30, 1920.
104
Under
this code, retained earnings were taxed at a rate of 10 % In case of a distribution, an
additional tax up to 10 % of the distribution amount was collected Besides, a
simultaneous increase in the individual's income tax rate lead to an even higher double
burden on distributed corporate earnings
105
On April 8, 1922, by another change of statute, the tax rate for commercial companies
was raised to 20 % and subsequently the rate on distributions was raised to 15 %. 106 At
the same time, dividend recipients were allowed to use between 10 and 15 % of the tax
amount paid on the distribution as a tax credit to be offset against their individual income
tax liability.
With the next changes of the statute on August 10, 1925, the additional tax on
distributions was abolished.
107
For smaller corporations, progressive tax rates became
applicable. On the other hand, there was no longer the possibility for dividend recipients to
impute advanced paid corporate tax on their individual income tax liability. From then on a
double burden lasted on distributed corporate income.
In 1934, another change of law provided the end of the beneficial treatment of smaller
corporations.
108
In the following years, the corporate tax rate was raised and reached its
peak after the 2. World War at 65 %. 109
Legislators made a first significant step in the direction of the eventually upcoming Tax
Reform of 1977 by decreasing the applicable tax rate for distributed corporate income
with the change of the law in June 1953.
uo From then on there was a split corporate tax
175) raising this by change of statute on March 10. 1894 to a rate of 4 % on income exceeding 100.000
Mark per year, see Gesetz- und Yerordnungsblatt, at 53.
104
See Reichsgesetzblatt 1 20.393.
105
According to the income tax code of March 29. 1920. the highest tax rate on individuals' income was
60 %. see Reichsgesetzblatt 1 20. 359.
106
See Reichsgesetzblatt 1 22, 472.
10"
See Reichsgesetzblatt J 25. 208.
108
See Reichsgestztblatt I 34. 103 1. 1287.
109
At the same time, the maximum tax rate on indmdual income amounted to 95 %!
110
See Bundesgestzblattl. 53. 413.
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rate The general rate was fixed at 60 %, but decreased to 30 % for distributed
dividends.
111
The next major step to ease the double burden was made in 1958 This time, the law
was changed to reduce the tax rate applicable to distributed income to 1 5 % whereas the
tax rate on retained earnings was set at 51 %.
112
This was the state of the law up to the
Tax Reform of 1977.
b) Reasons for Diminishing the Double Tax Burden
The change in law to a lower tax rate on distributions was not motivated by conceptual
but rather by political and economic considerations. In connection with other legislative
bills,
113
the pursued goal was to encourage the small investor to invest in company shares
by setting the legal framework for a sufficient return of capital As a result, the investor
should be given the opportunity to own his or her share of the means of production of the
German economy.
114
In addition to that, another of the federal government's official
reasons for decreasing the tax rate on distributed earnings was to create an incentive for
corporations to distribute higher dividends.
115
c) Further Criticism of the Double Tax Burden
The above discussed changes in law of 1953 and 1958 resulted in a substantial decrease
of the double tax burden. Still, there was ongoing criticism of the system.
111
In 1954. the general tax rate was decreased to 45 %. see Bundesgestzblatt 1 54. 373.
112
See Bundesgestzblatt 1. 58, 473.
113
E.g. the planned Code on savings premiums and the planned Code on increase ofcapital out ofequity.
114
See Written Report ofthe Financial Committee about the Government 's Bill to change tax statutes in
the area ofincome tax and procedure Iom\ BT- Drucksache III. 448; Christian Flaemig, Die Reform der




The Academic Advisory Committee of the Treasury Department (Wissenschaftlicher
Beirat beim Bundesminister der Finanzen) issued an expert opinion on the Reform of the
direct taxes in 1967.
116
According to this expert opinion, from an economic point of view
there should be no different tax treatment for retained and distributed corporate earnings,
since even the retained earnings indirectly increase the shareholder's wealth As a
consequence, corporations should be taxed the same way as partnerships are taxed.
However, because of non resolvable practical difficulties to immediately allocate all of the
corporate profits among its shareholders, the committee concludes it is impossible to
directly include the retained earnings in the shareholder's individual income Therefore it
recommends to keep the tax at the corporate level but provide a possibility to impute the
advanced paid corporate tax on the shareholder's income tax liability.
In the same direction aims the criticism of the Tax Reform Commission
(Steuerreformkommission). In its expert opinion, issued in 1971
m
, it pointed out the
following disadvantages connected with the corporate tax system of 1958: Profits of
business enterprises are taxed differently, depending on the legal form in which the
business enterprise functions. Next, the system favors debt financing over equity financing
and the double burden discourages potential investors to invest in the corporate sector
The commission also came to the conclusion that a direct inclusion of corporate profits in
the shareholders' income would cause unmanageable difficulties for the tax administration
and the business enterprises. The solution to the disadvantages is according to the
commission a tax reform towards the imputation system.
U6
See Schrifteiireihe des BMF. Heft 9.
117
This means generally one tax at the shareholder level.
118
See Schriftenreihe des BMF. Heft 17.
30
d) The Government's Position on the Double Tax Burden Issue
The government was of the opinion that the latest substantial changes of the corporate
tax law which led to a split tax rate for retained and distributed dividends were not
sufficient to diminish the double tax burden on distributed income. According to the
government's bill to further change the corporate tax law, the double taxation of
distributed dividends needed to be entirely abolished.
119
The government as well suggested
an imputation procedure to get rid of the double tax burden There was however a
conceptual difference to the suggestion of the Tax Reform Commission
The government does not question the justification of a corporate tax in general. The
German constitutional court ruled that corporate tax is the necessary consequence of legal
entities participating as independent legal persons in the economic market since otherwise,
retained earnings would never become subject to any taxation at all.
120 A direct inclusion
of retained corporate earnings in the shareholder's income would disregard the existence
of the legal entity. Such a piercing of the corporate veil is only acceptable under
extraordinary circumstances.
The government agreed with the German constitutional court on this issue. It didn't see
extraordinary circumstances in the situation of imposing the corporate tax on corporate
earnings. Tax law rather has to accept the legal circumstances created by the civil law. Tax
subject has to be the party that acts in the economic market, no matter whether it is a legal
entity or a natural person.
121






See BT-V/3500 p. 101 (In case of a legal entity, it is the corporation itself rather than its shareholders
that is the tax payer. Although the shareholders have a certain influence on the corporation s business
decisions, the corporation still is considered to be an independent entity being party to contracts itself.
.
Moreover, in most cases the management of the corporation has a greater influence on its activities than
the individual shareholder.)
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aa) Debt Over Equity Financing
The double burden of taxes on both the corporate and the shareholder level favors debt
financing over equity financing. Interest paid on debts are deductible business expenses for
the corporation Only the creditor has to pay taxes on the amount received Equity
financing on the other hand causes a two level tax procedure in form of corporate tax and
individual income tax in case of a distribution If there is no longer a double tax burden,
the gap between the costs for equity financing and debt financing is going to be much
smaller. Although the costs for equity financing were still going to be a little higher than
the costs for debt financing, the government was of the opinion that the substantial
decrease in costs as a result from the tax reform will trigger the use of equity financing and
thus improve the capital structure of the corporations.
bb) Prevention of Spread of Stock Ownership
The corporate tax law of 1958 basically discouraged the potential small interest
shareholder from actually investing in stocks Because of the tax disadvantages, an
investment in stock did not seem favorable for the potential small interest shareholder.
Thus, the tax law was an obstacle to the spread of stock ownership among a larger
number of investors. The tax reform is supposed to benefit especially shareholders with
low income. For such shareholders, their after tax dividend return increases the most This
is due to the progressive tax rates on the individual tax level and the fact that the
corporate level tax determined at a steady 1 tax rate is credited against every shareholder's
income tax liability.
32
cc) Corporate Tax Law Lacks Neutrality
Third, because of the substantial differences of tax consequences for doing business in
either the form of a partnership or a corporation, tax law is a major factor in
considerations which form of business enterprise should be chosen in order to pursue a
trade or business At the same time, economic and commercial factors have decreased in
meaning. The different taxation of the different business enterprises has an influence on the
competition. Thus, the tax law ceases to be neutral The abolishment of the double tax
burden is supposed to decrease the influence of the tax law on the decision in which legal
form a trade or business is pursued
dd) Conflict of Interest Between Vast and Small Interest Shareholders
122
There is the contradicting interest of shareholders owning a vast percentage of the
outstanding shares to the shareholders owning only a small portion of the outstanding
shares with regard to the decision to retain or distribute corporate profits The former
most likely favor the retention of profits, because they have a closer relation to the
corporation so they will prefer to build reserves rather than distribute profits and at the
same time look for new investments from other sources. The tax aspects support this
notion, since for vast interest shareholders with a presumably high progressive income tax
rate, the double tax burden on distributed profits would be higher than the single burden of
only corporate tax on retained profits.
On the contrary, small interest shareholders prefer a distribution, since for them the
double burden of diminished corporate tax on the distribution plus their individual income
122




tax presumably computed at a low tax rate will be lower than the burden of the corporate
tax on retained profits
The abolishment of such a double tax burden resolves the conflict of interest as far as it
was caused by these tax considerations, since distributed profits will no longer bear a
higher burden than retained profits
2. Present State of the Corporate Tax and Income Tax on Dividends
The tax reform was eventually enacted on January 1, 1977. The provisions dealing with
the taxation of corporate earnings, whether retained or distributed, have conceptually not
changed ever since.
a) Sources of Corporate Tax Law
In 1997, there are four different codes that contain the basic provisions dealing with the
taxation of corporations. The Corporation Tax Statute (CTS), the Federal Income Tax
Statute (FITS), the Commercial Code (CC) and the Corporate Acquisition Tax Code.
The CTS consists of six parts. The First Part (sections 1 to 6) defines the types of
organization to which the CTS applies. Corporations are the most important legal entities
that are taxed under the CTS, because the revenue raised under the CTS is predominantly
paid by corporations. The Second Part (sections 7 to 22) describes the determination of
income for corporate tax purposes. The Third Part (sections 23 to 26) states the tax rates
and provisions concerning the taxation of foreign income. The Fourth Part (sections 27 to
47) contains provisions that govern the imputation procedure . As a consequence of these
rules, the corporate tax is integrated with the income tax The Fifth Part (sections 48 to
34
52)w describes creation. determinatiorL collection and refund of the tax The Sixth Pan
(sections 53 to 55) contains authorization"" and final provisions
b) Tax Subject
Section 1 CTS lists all the corporate bodies, associations and conglomerations of assets
which are subject to unlimited corporate tax liability As a prerequisite, these legal entities
are required to have a domestic place of management or seat m order to be subject to
unlimited liability As one of the corporate tax subjects, corporations are explicitly
mentioned under section 1 (1) No 1 CTS U4
c) Tax Object. Determination of the Corporation's Taxable Income
aa) Basic Principles of the Determination
Tax object is the corporation's taxable income, section 7(1) CTS What is considered
as mcome and how income is to be determined is controlled by provisions of the FITS and
the CTS. section 8 (1) CTS In contrast to section 61 IRC of the U S . which defines
income as income from whatever source derived, the German FITS lists in its section 2(1)
No 1-7 seven sources of income, which appear to be an exclusive listing The seven
sources are earnings from farming and forestry, from trade and business, from self-
employed activity, earnings received for senices rendered as an employee, earnings from
capital assets, earnings from rent and lease, and finally miscellaneous earnings defined in
123
Secuon 53 CTS authorizes the government to implement regulauons dealing with the in the section
listed matters
24
Other than to corporations, the CTS is applicable to commercial cooperatives, mutual insurance
associations, other juridical persons under private law. clubs and societies, institutes and foundations
without legal existence and other assets dedicated to special purposes under private law and commercial
enterprises owned by public law bodies, see section 1(1) CTS This thesis will only address tax matters




The sum of these 7 sources of earnings minus two allowable




FITS lead to the total amount ofearnings,





is defined as income, section 2 (4) FITS This method of





visualizes the structure of income determination
Sources of profit earnings Sources of surplus earnings
Earnings from Earnings from
farming andforestry services rendered as an employee
trade and business capital assets
self-employed activity rent and lease
miscellaneous earnings
Sum of earnings
.1. deductions under sections 2 (3), 13 (3), 24a FITS
Total amount of earnings , section 2 (3) FITS
./. special expenses, sections 10 to lOi FITS
./. extraordinarv burdens, sections 33 to 33c FITS
Income , section 2 (4) FITS, 8(1) CTS
It needs to be mentioned that according to section 8 (2) CTS, for all taxpayers who are
required to keep books in accordance with provisions of the CC all income is considered
as earnings from trade or business Corporations are by legal definition of section 6 CC
merchants, and all merchants are required to keep books in accordance with the provisions
of the CC. Therefore section 8 (2) CTS applies to corporations with the consequence that
u
~ For the purpose of this thesis, there is no need to further describe this seventh source of income
126
This is a specific deduction in connection with the first income sourcefarming and forestry.
12
This is a reliefdeduction for persons who are at least 65 years of age
128 The special expenses are regulated in sections 10 to lOi FTTC
129 The extraordinary burdens are regulated in sections 33 to 33c FITC.
130
Section 8 (1) CTS reads: "What is considered as income and how income is to be determined is
controlled by the pronsions of the FITC and this statute
."
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corporation's earnings are always necessarily earnings from trade or business Since
earnings from trade or business is one of the sources of profit earnings, the FITS's
sections concerning the determination of profit apply
To determine a corporation's taxable income, the corporation has to create an annual
report, consisting of a balance sheet and a Statement of Operations, section 242 (1) to (3)
CC. This leads to the corporation's net-worth determined according to provisions of the
CC Section 4(1) FITS provides that for tax purposes, profit is the difference between the
corporation's net-worth at the end of the preceding business year and its net-worth at the
end of the current business year According to section 5 (1) FITS, the net-worth
determined under CC rules in connection with the unwritten principles of proper
accounting is to be used for the computation This is true as long as there are no divergent
provisions in the FITS.
13
In case of divergent provisions of the FITS, the according
adjustments have to be made to the financial accounting, section 60 (2) Administrative
Regulation to the FITS (ARFITS). to get to the profits according to the tax accounting,.
The following table shows the determination of a corporation's taxable income:
Profit according to commercial balance sheet, financial accounting
+ ./. Adjustments due to divergent FITS provisions, section 60 (2)
ARFITS
./. Tax exempt earnings, sections 3, 3a FITS
./. non-recognized earnings, section 8b CTS
./. refunds for non-deductible expenses
1 ' 4
+ disguised dividends
+ sum of all non-deductible business expenses, sections 3c. 4 (5)
FITS, 9 No 3, 10 CTS
Earnings from trade and business
131 HelmutHaas, Koerperschaftssteuer. 11. (4
m
ed. 1996).
!3 ~ The following example shall illustrate one of the differences between accounting rules of the CC and
the FITS with regard to the determination of profit A taxpayer (in this case the corporation) who
purchases a business value can take a depreciation for the entire purchase price in the year of purchase
under accounting rules of the CC. section 255 (4) CC For tax purposes, the taxpayer must spread the
depreciation of a business value over a period of 15 years, section 7 I FITS.
a
Haas, supra note 131. at 14
134
Non-deductible expenses are defined in section 10 CTS. e.g. taxes on income
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For corporations as corporate taxpayers, by definition of law all earnings are earnings
from trade and business, section 8 (2) CTS Therefore, earnings from trade and business
necessarily equal the sum of earnings Corporations cannot take advantage of the
deduction of section 13 (3) CTS, because this deduction requires earnings from the source
earningsfrom farming andforestry . Also, the section 24 (a) FITS deduction applies only
to individuals Therefore, the sum of earnings equals the total amount of earnings.
Because of the legal nature of corporations, the only possible special expense is the loss
deduction under section lOd FITS. This section provides that the losses are to be
deducted like special expenses from the total amount of income All of the other special
expenses and extraordinary burdens occur in connection with private expenses. A
corporation by definition does not have a private sector. In the case such expenses
occurred, they already decreased the corporation's profit as business expenses.
Consequently, the total amount of income minus losses (under section lOd FITS) equals
the corporate income For corporations as tax subjects under the CTS, the so determined
corporate income is equivalent to its taxable income
n5
bb) Special Provisions for Integrated Companies
The CTS provides in sections 14 to 19 special provisions for integrated companies.
Section 14 CTS states the prerequisites under which two corporations are considered to
be integrated companies First, section 14 CTS requires a financial, economic and
organizational integration between a dominant enterprise and a subsidiary corporation.
The financial integration exists if the dominant enterprise has an uninterrupted and direct
participation in the integrated subsidiary from the beginning of the latter' s financial year
such that the dominant enterprise holds the majority of the voting rights of the shares of
135
Sections 24; 25 CTS pro\ide two more tax exempt minimum thresholds, that are according to sections




The organizational integration is deemed to exist if again
from the beginning of the integrated subsidiary's year it is secured that the subsidiary
enforces its business decisions according to the expectations of the management of the
dominant enterprise
137
Economic integration requires the integrated subsidiary to be in a
state of a economic purpose dependency to the dominant enterprise.
138
This is the case if
the integrated subsidiary acts like an dependent branch of the dominant enterprise, serving
the latter's economic interest.
139
Besides these three elements of integration, the subsidiary company has to enter into an
agreement for the transfer of profits whereby it obligates itself to transfer its entire profit
to another domestic commercial enterprise, the dominant enterprise.
140
Such an agreement
for the transfer of profits must be for a period of at least five years, must be carried out for
this period and must be effective beginning at the latest by the end of the financial year of
the integrated subsidiary for which the legal consequences for the integrated companies
shall apply.
141
Such consequence is that the income of the integrated subsidiary is to be attributed to
the dominant enterprise, section 14, first sentence CTS.
142
The dominant enterprise must be a resident individual, a non-tax-exempt juridical
entity, association or conglomeration of assets as defined in section 1 CTS 143 with
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See section 14 No 1 CTS.
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Section 14 No 2 CTS states as an example that such organizational integration is always present if the
integrated subsidiary has entered into a subordination agreement as described in section 291 (1) of the
Stock Corporation Law which subordinates the management of its business to the dominant enterprise or
if the integrated subsidiary is an integrated company under the provisions of sections 3 19 through 327 of
the Stock Corporation Law.
138
See section 50 of the Regulation to the CTS
139
Id. (This can be done by developing and producing products especially for the dominant enterprise).
140
See section 14, first sentence CTS.
141
See section 14 No 4 CTS.
142
Section 16 CTS provides an exception to this general rule: The integrated subsidiary is itself taxable on
its income to the extent of the equalization payments and the applicable distribution burden of the
dominant enterprise. Such equalization payments are e.g. payments to make up for the formation of the
agreement for the transfer of profits.
143
Section 1 CTS list all corporate bodies that are subject to unlimited tax liability.
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domestic place of management and seat, or a partnership as defined in section 1 5 ( 1 ) No 2
FITS with domestic place of management and seat.
144
d) Tax Rates
For corporations under section 1(1) No 1 CTS, the Code as of 1997 provides two
different tax rates. Which one of the tax rates eventually apply depends on whether the
corporation retains its earnings or whether the corporation distributes its earnings to the
shareholders in form of dividends. The corporation tax rate on retained earnings is 45 %
of the taxable income, section 23 CTS. This tax amount is called the statutory burden.
The distribution of earnings in form of dividends has an effect on the applicable
corporate tax rate. The amount of the dividend is going to be taxed at a rate of 30 %,
section 27 (1) CTS. This tax amount is called the distribution burden.
These provisions cause the following consequences: First, the corporate tax is
determined according to section 23 (1) CTS at a tax rate of 45 %. If the corporation
decides to distribute dividends, the corporate tax will decrease from 45 % to 30 %. Thus,
the statutory burden is lowered by 1 5 % to the distribution burden. In contrast, if there is
no corporate tax on the corporation's income because of an exemption provision, in case
of a distribution the corporate tax will increase from % to the distribution burden of
30 %.
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Such tax exemption provisions apply only to corporate income that is not
distributed in form of dividends.
As a result, the application of a lower tax rate (30 % instead of 45 %) leads to a larger
amount that can be distributed, whereas the application of a higher tax rate (30 % instead
of %) decreases the amount that can be distributed.
144
See section 14 No 3 CTS.
145
This is not valid for tax exempt foreign income. Sections 40 No 1; 30 (2) No 1 CTS pnmdes that for
foreign income there is no increase of corporate tax under section 27 CTS.
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e) Imputation Procedure
Corporations are taxable entities, section 23 CTS Dividends distributed by
corporations to their shareholders are income to these shareholders That income is
subject to the individual income tax if the shareholder is a natural person. If the
shareholder is a corporation, such income is going to be subject to corporate tax again.
This is true for domestic income. Therefore, under German corporate tax law, there is no
dividend received deduction for corporations receiving a distribution paid out of the
domestic income portion of the distributing company's equity.
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Thus, the corporate
profits are subject to taxation on two levels, the corporate and the individual level. On the
individual level, tax object is not only the distribution but also the distribution burden
Thus, subject to the shareholder's income tax is the distributed profit before the deduction
of the distribution burden. The imputation procedure removes such a double burden in
two steps: On the corporate level, for distributed profits a distribution burden of 30 % is
established. On the individual level, the corporate tax (the distribution burden of 30 %) is
imputed on the individual's income tax liability Imputation means a deduction of the
corporate tax from the shareholder's income tax.
147
As a result, the corporate tax is
abolished. The distribution plus the distribution burden is eventually subject exclusively to
the shareholder's income tax, taxed at the shareholder's individual income tax rate.
148
146
Section 8 b CTS presides an exception for distribution that are paid out of the foreign income portion
of the distributing companies equity. If the distributing as well as the recehing company are both
taxpayers subject to unlimited tax liability, such a distribution is disregarded for the determination of the
receiving company "s income.
141
Haas, supra note 131, at 47.
148
GeorgCrezelius, STEUERRECHTU. 245 (2 nd ed. 1994).
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aa) Corporate Level Taxation
Once the corporation's taxable income is determined, under section 23 (1) CTS the
applicable tax rate is 45 % (statutory burden) As far as foreign earnings are included in
the determined taxable income, such foreign earnings are likely to be subject to the
according corporate tax of the particular country Therefore, foreign earnings are already
burdened by such a foreign corporate tax. Under section 26 (1) CTS or, if in existence,
under a special Tax Treaty between the countries, the amount of the foreign corporate tax
can be deducted from the German corporate tax liability if such a foreign corporate tax
corresponds to the German corporate tax The deduction is allowed only to the extent that
the portion of the income would have been taxed under German law.
Example: A corporation has income ofDM 100,000 of which DM 10,000 are foreign
earnings. The foreign earnings ofDM 10,000 are taxed at the according corporate tax rate
of the foreign country (eg 40 %), which results in a tax liability ofDM 4,000 These facts
lead to the following statutory burden under sections 23 (1), 26 (1) CTS, alternatively a
Tax Treaty
Taxable income DM 100,000
Statutory burden (45 %, section 23 (1 ) CTS) DM 45,000
Foreign corporate tax deduction under section
26 ( 1 ) CTS or Tax Treaty ./. DM 4.000
Remaining tax liability DM 4 1 ,000
From the perspective of the corporation, the deduction abolishes the foreign corporate
tax. If the foreign tax rate was higher than the German tax rate of 45 % (say the foreign
income of DM 10,000 was taxed on a rate of 50 % leading to a foreign corporate tax of
DM 5,000) the allowable deduction would only be as high as the German corporate tax
liability would have been for this portion of income In the case of income ofDM 10,000.
the highest possible deduction is therefore DM 4,500
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Taxable income DM100,000
Statutory burden (45 %, section 23 ( 1 ) CTS) DM 45,000
Foreign corporate tax deduction under section
26 ( 1 ) CTS or Tax Treaty ./. DM 4.500
Remaining tax liability DM 40,500
Under the latter fact pattern, the corporation ends up paying DM 500 of corporate tax
more than in the former fact pattern, although at first glance the lower remaining tax
liability in the latter fact pattern seems to indicate a lower overall tax payment. The higher
tax liability in the first fact pattern is due to the circumstance that in the first scenario it
can use the entire amount of already paid foreign corporate tax of DM 4,000 as a
deduction, whereas in the second scenario only DM 4,500 of the already paid DM 5,000
as foreign corporate tax are allowed as a deduction As long as the foreign corporate tax
does not exceed the German corporate tax that would have been determined for the
specific amount of income, the entire foreign tax can be used a deduction. Therefore such
a deduction leads to the abolishment of the foreign corporate tax up to the extent such
income would have been subject to the applicable German corporate tax rate of 45 %.
149
In the case of tax exempt corporate income, the applicable tax rate is %.
The imputation procedure contains the provisions to make sure that distributed
earnings - with the exception of the above mentioned foreign earnings - are taxed at the
distribution burden of 30 % 15° The key provision is section 27 (1) CTS:
"If a resident corporation makes a distribution of profits, then the corporation tax
will be decreased or increased by an amount equal to the difference between the tax
burden to which the equity which is deemed to be used for the distribution under
section 28 was subject in the hands of the corporation (statutory burden) and a
burden of 30 % of the profit before deduction of the corporation tax (distribution
burden)"
149
Haas, supra note 131. at 43.
150 Mat 47.
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The provision provides that the corporation tax will be decreased or increased The
following examples illustrate the effect of section 27 (1) CTS.
Example for decrease in corporate tax:
A-corporation has profits of 1000 DM in 01. A-corporation is subject to unlimited tax
liability. A tax exemption provision does not apply.
Profits before corporate tax: 1,000 DM
Corporate tax, section 23 (1) CTS ./. 450DM
After corporate tax {statutory burden) profit 550 DM
In this case, the statutory burden of 45 % applies to compute the tax liability of the
corporation. If the corporation decides to distribute the entire or parts of the after
corporate tax profit, according to section 27 (1) CTS, the distribution burden of 30 % has
to be established.
Profits before corporate tax 1,000 DM
Corporate tax, section 23 (1) CTS ./. 450 DM
After corporate tax profit 550 DM
Tax decrease (15/55x550.00 DM) + 150 DM
Capital gains tax (25 % of the dividend
of 700.00 DM [550.00 DM + 150.00 DM]) 151 ./. 175 DM
After tax dividend 525 DM
The difference between the statutory burden of 45 % and the distribution burden of 30
% is 15 %. In the case of a distribution of profits subject to the statutory burden, the tax
burden decreases by said 15 %. The relation between the tax decrease and the distribution
151
Capital gains tax is no tax of its own but a special form of income tax collection in form of a
withholding tax. Under sections 20 (1) No 1; 43 (1) No 1; 43a (1) No 1 FITS, dividends are subject to
capital gains tax at a rate of 25 %. The recipient of the dividend has to report income in the amount of the
dividend plus the amount of the capital gains tax. Eventually, the 25 % tax burden is credited to the
dividend recipients income tax liability, section 36 (2) No 2 FITS. Purpose of this capital gains tax is to
fight the taxpayers' tendency not to report capital gain as income in their tax reports. From a material
point of view, the capital gains tax is an advanced pavment on the recipients income tax {see Crezelius.
supra note 146. at 104
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(before the capital gains tax) can be expressed by the fraction of 15/70 The relation
between the tax decrease and the after corporate tax profit corresponds to the fraction of
15/55.
In the example, since the entire after corporate tax profit is distributed, the amount of
tax decrease (equals the amount of distribution increase) is determined by 15/55 x 550
DM = 150 DM. The statutory burden of 450 DM decreases by 150 DM to the
distribution burden of 300 DM The decision to distribute the entire after corporate tax
profit leads automatically to the highest possible distribution amount, because now there is
no portion of the corporate income left that is taxed at the statutory burden of 45 %.
The considerations are different when only a part of the after corporate tax profit is
distributed. If only the amount of the distribution {distribution) and its origin from after
corporate tax profits is known, the amount of the tax decrease is determined by the
fraction 15/70 of the distribution. Taking the fact pattern of the example and presuming
that A-corporation decides to distribute 350 DM, the tax decrease is determined by 15/70
x 350 DM = 75 DM. This calculation is based on the fact that a distribution always
corresponds to the number 70 and that a distribution of 70 decreases the corporate tax by
15 The remaining numbers are the following:
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Distributionwithout distribution burden 350 DM
Distribution burden (3/7 of 3 50 DM) + 150 DM
Distribution plus distribution burden, ration 7/3 500 DM
Retained profits 500 DM
Statutory burden of45 % ./. 225 DM
Net profits after statutory burden 275 DM
If 350 DM of 1,000 DM are distributed, the corporate tax amounts to 375 DM (150
DM distribution burden plus 225 DM statutory burden). Compared to the corporate tax
of 450 DM (45 % of 1.000 DM) in the case of 1,000 DM of retained profits, the
45
difference amounts to 75 DM This difference of 75 DM equals the calculated decrease in
corporate tax by applying the fraction of 15/70 to the distribution amount of 350 DM.
Example for increase in corporate taxation
A-corporation has profits of 1,000 DM in 01. The entire amount is tax exempt. 153
Therefore there is no statutory burden of 45 %. If 1,000 DM are distributed, the
distribution burden of 30 % has to be established, section 27 (1) CTS.
Profits, tax exempt 1,000 DM
Distribution burden (30 %) 300 DM
Possible distribution 700 DM
With regard to the tax exempt profits, in case of a distribution the corporate tax
increases by 3/10 (from % to 30 %). Only 7/10 of the tax exempt profits can be
distributed, since 3/10 are needed to pay the distribution burden. With regard to the
distribution, the corporate tax is increased by 3/7.
E.g., if the corporations decides to distribute 350.00 DM, the distribution burden is
150 DM (3/7 of 350.00 DM).
Example for simultaneous increase and decrease of corporate tax
A-corporation made in 01 profits of 2,000 DM Profits of 1,000 DM are tax exempt
A-corporation decides to distribute the entire amount of profits
If the corporation distributes simultaneously profits that already bear a statutory burden
of 45 % (this amount is reported in the equity 45 account, section 30 (1) No 1 CTS) and
profits from tax exempt earnings (this amount is reported in the equity account, section
30 (1) No 2 CTS), the result is a decrease in corporate tax with regard to the amount
152
In this calculation, the capital gains tax is not considered. The capital gains tax amounts to 25 % of the
distributed 350 .00 DM = 87.50 DM. For the purpose of this example, the capital gains tax is of no
relevance.
153
E.g., earnings listed in section 3 FITS are tax exempt. As far section 3 FITS applies to corporations'
earnings, such earnings are tax exempt from the corporate tax.
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already bearing the statutory burden and an increase in corporate tax with regard to the
amount that represents tax exempt earnings.
Profits 2,000 DM
Tax exempt profits ./. LOOP DM
Taxable corporate income 1 ,000 DM
Statutory burden of45% ./. 450 DM
After statutory burden profits 550 DM
Since the entire after statutory burden profits are distributed, the corporate tax
decreases by 15/55 of 550 DM, which equals 150 DM. The distribution of the formerly
unburdened profits leads to a corporate tax increase by 30/100 of 1,000 DM = 300 DM
Statutory burden 450 DM
Decrease ./. 150 DM
Increase + 300 DM
Corporate tax for 1 600 DM
The overall tax burden on the distribution of the profits of 2,000 DM amounts to 600
DM. This corresponds to the distribution burden of 30 % (30 % of 2,000 DM = 600
DM)
bb) Structure of the Available Net Equity for Distributions
The examples under aa) show that depending on whether equity used for the
distribution was subject to corporate tax in the hands of the corporation (statutory burden)
or whether the distribution was made out of tax exempt earnings, there is an increase or
decrease in corporate tax during the process of establishing the distribution burden In
order to properly determine the distribution burden, the corporation has to be able to
prove whether the distribution amount is taken from the portion of the equity which is
burdened with the statutory burden or whether the distribution amount is taken from the
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portion of the tax exempt equity Thus the CTS requires a certain structure of the equity
account.
First, section 29 (1) CTS defines equity as "business capital indicated by the difference
between the assets and liabilities on the tax balance sheet without adjustment of the
corporation tax which would result from section 27 CTS 154". According to section 29 (2)
CTS, at the end of each financial year the equity is to be divided into equity available for
distribution (available net equity) and other equity. Available net equity is the excess of
equity over stated capital as determined at the close of the financial year preceding the
corporate resolution concerning distributions.
155
Thus section 29 CTS determines the
amount of the available net equity.
Section 30 CTS (1) CTS asks for a certain structure of the equity:
"At the end of each financial year the available net equity is to be allocated
according to its statutory burden. The individual portions are to be based on
the allocation established in the past financial year [...] the portions of
available net equity are to be separately accounted for based on the extent to
which they have originated from
1. portions of income which after December 31, 1993 were subject to
unreduced corporation tax [equity with a tax burden of 45 %, such account is
called equity 45],
2. portions of income which after December 31, 1993 were subject to




3. increases in net worth which were not subject to corporation tax or
which increased the equity of the corporation in a financial year ending prior
154
Section 27 CTS regulates the decrease or increase in corporate tax in case of the distribution of
dividends.
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Section 29 (2) CTS concludes that if there is no corporate resolution concerning distributions, the
actual distribution will be used in its place.
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Portions of income which are subject to reduced corporate tax of 30 % originate from a division
according to section 32 CTS. As seen under supra III.B.2.e)aa). e.g. the deduction of foreign corporate
tax can actually lead to a decrease of the statutory burden, when the creditable foreign tax is lower than
the German statutory burden of 45 % would have been. Such a lower burdened portion of income can no
longer be listed appropriately in the equity 45 account. In this situation, section 32 (2) CTS rules that
portions of equity which have born a reduced tax burden are to be allocated as follows: A portion of equity
whose reduced statutory burden is less than the distribution burden of 30 % is to be divided into one
portion whose burden is equivalent to the distribution burden and one portion bearing no corporation tax
burden. Is the reduced statutory burden higher than the distribution burden of 30 %. the portion of equity
is to be divided into one portion whose burden is equivalent to the distribution burden of 30 % and one
portion bearing the unreduced statutory burden of 45 %.
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to January 1, 1977 [equity with a tax burden of %, called equity
account].
157"
The structuring of the equity according to section 30 CTS enables the
corporation to determine the tax burden of the equity used for the distribution. In
case that a corporation has an equity 45, an equity 30 and an equity account,
section 28 III CTS regulates the order in which distributions are deemed to be
distributed, that is in the order such accounts are listed under section 30 CTS. This
means that first the equity 45 account is used for distributions, then the equity 30
account and finally the equity account in the order equity 01 through 04. Purpose
of such a legal fiction is to primarily reach a decrease in corporate tax for the
corporation.
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cc) Shareholder Level Taxation
The shareholder is either a natural person or a legal entity. For the natural person
shareholder, if his interest in the corporation is part of his private fortune, a distribution
qualifies as earningsfrom capital assets, section 20 (1) No 1 FITS. If his interest in the
corporation belongs to his business capital, distributions are part of the source of income
that the business capital is part of
159
Is the shareholder a corporation, the distribution is necessarily earningsfrom trade and
business As already mentioned, all the corporation's earnings are by definition of law
earningsfrom trade and business, section 8 (2) CTS.
15 The equity is furthermore subdhided into four accounts, labeled equity 01 through equity 04. see
section 30 (2) No 1 through No 4 CTS. Equity 01 contains foreign income earned in a financial year after
December 31, 1976. equity 02 is for increases in net worth which are not subject to corporate tax and do
not fall under No 3 and No 4, equity 03 is for available net equity originating in a financial year ending
before January 1, 1977, and equity 04 contains capital contributions by the shareholders which have
increased equity in a financial year ending after December 31. 1976.
158
Haas, supra note 131, at 81.
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The distribution is taxed with 25 % capital gains tax, sections 43 (1) No 1; 43a (1) No
1 FITS. The shareholder has to report the distribution amount as income including the
capital gains tax.
160
However, the already paid capital gains tax is going to be credited
against the final income tax liability of the shareholder, section 36 (2) No 2 FITS.
Example
A-corporation distributes 700 DM. Capital gains tax is 25 % of 700 DM = 1 75
DM The shareholder actually receives 525 DM (700 DM - 175 DM) His income for
income tax purposes is however 700 DM.
Besides the distribution of 700 DM, the statutory burden of 300 DM (3/7 of 700 DM)
has to be included in the taxpayer's income, section 20 (1) No 3 FITS. Identical to the
corporate gains tax, the statutory burden is eventually credited against the final income tax
liability of the shareholder, section 36 (2) No 3 FITS
Since the law allows the taxpayer to use the capital gains tax and the corporate tax as a
tax credit against his personal income tax liability, the consequences are the following:
Distribution (section 20 (1) No 1 FITS), including
capital gains tax ofDM 175)
Distribution burden (section 20 (1) No 3 FITS)
Taxable income
Income tax rate of 50 % 161
Income tax
Credit of capital gains tax (25 % ofDM 700), section
36 (2) No 2 FITS
Credit of corporate tax , section 36 (2) No 3 FITS
Tax liability DM 25
Depending on the individual income tax rate of the shareholder, the corporate and
capital gains tax as creditable taxes might lead to a tax refund for the shareholder. This is
due to the fact that a corporate distribution bears a tax burden of 47,5 % before the
shareholder credits the distribution burden and the capital gains tax against his income tax
159
According to section 20 (3) FITS, that can be the income sourcesfarming andforestry, trade and
business, self-employed activity and rent and lease.
160









liability. The 47,5 % tax burden is determined by adding the distribution burden of 30 %
plus the capital gains tax of 17,5 %.
162
Thus, as long as the shareholder's individual tax
rate exceeds 47,5 %, the creditable tax amount will still leave a remaining tax liability for
the shareholder. Is the shareholder's individual income tax rate less than 47,5 %, the
creditable taxes will lead to a tax refund, as the following example illustrates:
Distribution (section 20 ( 1) No 1 FITS), including
capital gains tax ofDM 175)
Distribution burden (section 20 (1) No 3 FITS)
Taxable income
Income tax rate of 25 % 163
Income tax
Credit of capital gains tax (25 % ofDM 700), section
36 (2) No 2 FITS
Credit of corporate tax , section 36 (2) No 3 FITS







This income tax rate is chosen arbitrarily for this example.
161
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The capital gains tax is 25 % of the after corporate tax distribution, which corresponds to 17.5 % of the
before corporate tax distribution. The after corporate tax distribution is 70 % of the entire distribution,
since the corporate tax rate is 30 %. 25 % capital gains tax of the after corporate tax distribution of 70 %
is 17,5 % Thus, in relation to the entire before corporate tax distribution amount, the capital gains tax is
17.5 %.
163
The income tax rate is chosen arbitrarily for this example.
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IV. Problem of "Double Taxation"
A. The Term "Double Taxation"
The term double taxation is used in two different contexts.
To better understand these contexts, a description of the basic elements of taxation is
given. Regardless of the kind of tax that is raised, the following elements are always
needed in this process. In order to determine a tax liability, four elements need to be taken
into account. The tax subject
164
, the concrete tax object,
165
the tax rate and the tax
creditor.
166 By applying the tax rate to the tax object, the tax liability of the tax subject
towards the tax creditor is determined.
As the term "double taxation" indicates, somebody or something is being made subject
to the process of taxation twice. Using the terms introduced in the previous paragraph, the
first "double taxation" scenario can be described as follows: Two different tax creditors
impose a tax on a tax subject's identical portion of his concrete tax object This results in
a double tax liability for the tax subject with regard to the identical portion of the concrete
tax object In other words the tax subject (the taxpayer) and a portion of the concrete tax
object (part of the taxpayer's taxable income in the case of the income or corporate tax)
are the elements that are subject to double taxation. It should be noticed that in this
scenario the tax subject that is potentially subject to a double taxation is one taxpayer. An
164
This is the taxpayer who is liable for the determined tax. In case of the Federal Income Tax. the tax
subject is an individual, in case of the corporate tax, the tax subject is a legal entity.
165
The concrete tax object needs to be distinguished from the tax base. The concrete tax object is the
amount that is determined out of the tax base. Afterwards, the tax rate is applied to the concrete tax object
in order to determine the tax liability. For U.S. income tax and corporate tax purposes the tax base is
according to section 61 (a) ERC generally "all income from whatever source derived." Concrete tax subject
would be the final taxable amount of income after taking all the inclusion, exclusion and deduction
provisions into account
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example for such a scenario could be a German corporation (the taxpayer) having a
domestic place of management or seat earning domestic as well as foreign income in the
United States Because of its domestic place of management or seat it is subject to
unlimited tax liability under the German CTS.
167
Unlimited corporation tax liability extends
to all categories of income,
168
therefore also including foreign income. Presuming that the
United States levy a corporate tax on such income, such portion of the income could be
taxed twice to the corporation.
169
As explained in footnote 167, the CTS as well as the tax
treaty between Germany and the United States deal with this scenario of possible double
taxation, eventually providing effective relief from a potential double burden of corporate
or individual income.
170
The second scenario in which "double taxation" is discussed refers to the situation
where two different tax subjects are taxed on one portion of the tax object. This might
occur in the case of a corporation distributing its after tax profits to its shareholders. Both
are separate taxable entities.
171
Corporations have to pay a corporate tax on their
corporate income.
172
If they decide to distribute parts or all of the after corporate tax
income, such distributions are under certain prerequisites taxable as income to the
166
In the case of federal income taxes, tax creditor is the internal revenue service as subdivision of the
federal government.
167
See section 1 (l)CTS.
168
See section 1 (2) CTS.
169
For a German corporation, it is rather unlikely to be taxed twice on its foreign income. The CTS
provides in section 26 (1) that if a taxpayer is subject to unlimited tax liability and realizes foreign income
that is subject to a tax corresponding to the domestic corporation tax. then the assessed and paid foreign
tax is to be credited against the domestic corporation tax which is attributable to the income having its
source in that country. Moreover, a tax treaty between the countries (like the tax treaty between the United
States and Germany) might allow to use the foreign corporate tax as a deduction against the corporate tax
liability according to the domestic corporate tax statute.
170
See explanation supra on page 36.
171 Barton et al., supra note 56. at 40.
172
See section 1 1 IRC. It should be noticed that section 1363 (a) IRC provides that no corporate tax is
imposed on an electing small business corporation, called an "S Corporation'. However, this thesis deals
with corporations that are not eligible for the "S Corporation" election. E.g., this is true for corporations
with more than 35 shareholders (section 1361 (b) (1) (A) IRC) or for corporations that have more than
one class of stock (section 1361 (b) (1) (D) IRC).
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shareholders under the IRC. 173 Thus, in the United States distributed corporate income is
subject to taxation on the corporate as well as the individual shareholder level. As
described supra under III B 2 e, according to the German tax law, due to the imputation
procedure regulated in the CTS such distributions are not subject to taxation on the
corporate level. The conclusion that under U.S. tax law the same portion of the tax object
is subject to taxation twice although there are undoubtedly two different tax subjects
requires an economic evaluation of the situation.
174
Since the tax treaty between the United States and Germany provides relief for double
taxation in the first scenario for both American and German corporations, in this chapter
the thesis deals only with the issue of double taxation occurring in the second scenario.
B. Criticism of the Double Taxation for Distributed Corporate Earnings in the
U.S.
As seen in the previous chapter,
175
following the tax reform of 1977, the German
corporate tax law does no longer provide double taxation on distributed corporate
earnings. Consequently, criticism of the double taxation in the context of corporate
distributions is only a matter in the United States.
173
See supra p. 15; To the extent the IRC qualifies such distributions as dividends, the distributions are
included in the recipient's gross income, sections 301; 316; 61 (a) (7) IRC.
174
Otherwise it could be argued that there is no identical portion of a concrete tax object, since first the
concrete tax object belongs to the corporation, and second it is the shareholder' s concrete tax object.
175
See supra III. B. 2.
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1. Adverse Criticism of the Double Taxation
The double taxation is generally criticized on three grounds These are the grounds of
tax inequity, economic inefficiency and administrative complexity As a solution to the
problem, the critics suggest an integration of corporate and shareholder taxes.
a) Double Taxation and Tax Inequity
As described supra under II. B , taxpayers should be taxed according to their ability to
pay, and such ability to pay is determined by the taxpayer's income.
176
Furthermore, in
accordance with the basic principle of equality under the law, all individuals with the same
income should be taxed alike, irrespective of the source from which the income was
received.
177
Critics of the double taxation argue as follows:
The United States tax law generally requires a realization of gain leading to an increase
in the ability to pay before the individual is taxed on such an increase in wealth
178
Such
requirement is called the realization doctrine In case of the corporation and shareholder
relationship, the realization doctrine prevents the shareholder from being taxed on retained
earnings of the corporation. Although such accumulated income adds to the value of each
shareholder's stock,
179
tax law requires a sale or other disposition as a realization act
before the asset appreciation
180
is taken into account in the individual's income tax base.
181
The corporate tax serves the purpose to reach such an asset appreciation that otherwise
176
Kwall. see supra note 29, at 627. Musgrave & Musgraye. supra note 4. at 232-246.
177
See supra II.B. 1; Kwall, supra note 29. at 627-28.
178
Id.; The realization doctrine was first applied in Eisner v. Macomber. 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Scott A.
Taylor, supra note 1. at 244.
179
Kwall. supra note 29. at 629 (Kwall contends that "gain on a sale of stock generally includes
undistributed corporate earnings because those earnings add to the value of corporate stock, id. at 622 n.
45; C. McLure, supra note 28. at 20 n. 3 (1979)).
180 From the perspective of the shareholder, his interest in the corporation in form of shares are assets
181
Taylor, supra note 1. at 246 (The author points out that "[a]s a matter of personal wealth, a ten dollar
dividend from a share of stock is no different from a ten dollar increase in the value of the same stock."
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would be sheltered by the realization doctrine. In other words, the corporate tax takes the
function of simulating the individual income tax that would be collected if dividends were
distributed.
182
Such a justification for the corporate tax works only to the extent that
accumulated earnings are taxed. As far as corporate income that is not intended to be
distributed is concerned, a corporate tax is believed to further the tax policy goal of
equity. To the extent that distributed earnings bear a corporate tax, there is a greater
burden on such income compared to the burden on income from other sources,
183
leading
to an overtaxation of distributed income.
The following table visualizes the increased tax burden under the presumption of a
uniform corporate and individual tax rate:
184










As the table shows, the aggregate tax burden on dividends in case of the two tier










182 A counter argument to this justification of the corporate tax is provided by Musgrave. He questions the
extent to which a corporate tax levied on retained corporate income furthers equity Such a tax may cause
corporate income to bear the same burden as other forms of income. However, the equitable ideal focuses
on burdens borne by people, not by income, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance.
173-75 (1959).
183
Kwall. supra note 29. at 630; Taylor, supra note 1. at 243.
184
The table is part of the table contained in Kwall. supra note 29, at 632 n. 99.
185
Presuming a uniform tax rate of 90 % and distributed corporate income of 100, on the corporate level
this would lead to a tax liability of 90, leaving 10 for the distribution. The distributed 10 would be subject
to 90 % income tax, leaving 1 as a net distribution. Thus the aggregate burden on dividends in this
example is 99 %.
56
shareholder level. Such an additional burden violates the "equitable ideal that all
individuals with equal incomes should bear equivalent tax burdens".
b) Double Taxation and Economic Inefficiency
As described supra under II B. 2., the tax policy goal of economic efficiency requires
tax norms to be as neutral as possible with regard to influencing people's decision making.
There is a notion that economic efficiency is disturbed to the extent that economic
decisions are distorted by the tax system, and that any tax-induced change in behavior is
unfavorable.
187
Thus, as far as double taxation influences economic decisions, such a
system no longer complies with the neutrality ideal In the legal literature, three
arguments are made to contend that double taxation practically has an impact on economic
decision making and therefore distorts the tax policy goal of economic efficiency. First,
double taxation leads to finance corporate investment with debt rather than new equity,
second double taxation has the effect to discourage individuals from investing in the
corporate sector, and finally double taxation prevents corporations from making
economically profitable investments.
aa) The Debt Versus Equity Financing Argument
There are two ways to establish the capital structure of a corporation. The investors
who decided to invest in the corporate sector can generally chose between a debt or equity
investment in a corporation. The investor choosing the debt financing method obtains as a
86
Kwall, supra note 29. at 633.
187
See S.Rep. No. 313, 99
th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 7-8 (1986).
188
D. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 178-79 (1986); Kwall. supra note 29. at 641.
189
Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes. 94 Harv. L. Rev.
717 (1981); C. McLure, supra note 28; C. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532 (1975).
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creditor "the right to the return of the investment on a fixed schedule with a fixed rate of
return and with a superior claim to that of any shareholder."
190 On the other hand, the
investor choosing to invest in the corporation's equity "obtains a right to share in the
(potentially unlimited) net profits from the venture once all those holding superior claims
have gotten theirs."
191
The tax law treats these two forms of investment differently. The tax burden on a debt
financed investment is lower than the tax burden on an investment in a corporation's
equity. The corporation's interest payments on the use of the debt capital is treated like a
business expense, allowing the corporation to take a deduction from its tax base.
192
Payments in form of dividends on the other side do not give rise to a deduction for the
corporation.
193
The following example shall illustrate the different consequences of the tax
law on the two investment forms:
194
For the purpose of demonstrating the different tax burdens, it is presumed that all
investments generate a ten percent pre-tax return
195
, that the cost of both forms of
investment is five percent
196
and that there is a uniform tax rate of 30 %.
Equity Finance Debt Finance
Amount invested $1,000 $1,000
Pretax gross return $100 $100
Cost of capital of5% $50 $50
Return net of cost
of capital $50 $50
190 Kahx & Lehman, supra note 47. at 48
19>192
See section 163 IRC; Barton etal.. supra note 56. at 41; Taylor, supra note 1. at 253.
193 Kahn & Lehman, supra note 47. at 49; Taylor, supra note 1. at 253 n.76 (Taylor points out that "the
nondeductibility of dividends is to be inferred from the absence of a provision permitting a deduction for
them '*); Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner. 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (The court evaluates such
payments as "the analog of personal consumption").
194
Kwall. supra note 29. at 643 (The author uses this example to illustrate the opimon of the "legal
literature*'.
195
Kwall contends that this presumption is made in the legal literature, see id. at 642 n. 157. referring to
Warren, supra note 189. at 725; Eric M. Zolt. Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A
State of Disequilibrium. 860 (1988).
96
Kwall points out that "[t]reating the cost of debt and equity capital as identical is consistent with the
legal literature, which does not take into account different degrees of risk." See supra note 29. at 643 n.
164.
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Corporate tax of30% $_30 $J_5
Return net of tax $ 20 $35
Note that for the equity investment, since dividends are not deductible, the corporate
tax rate is applied to the pretax gross return of $ 100, whereas for the debt investment, the
tax rate is applied to the return net of cost of capital of $ 50, an amount reduced by the
deduction of the interest paid. As the example illustrates, the corporate tax burden on the
pretax gross return in case of an investment in the corporation's equity it substantially
higher than the corporate tax burden in case of a debt investment. Under the presumption
that corporate management tries to increase the amount available for distributions as much
as possible,
197
the different tax consequences cause investors and corporations to rather
chose corporate debt than equity financing.
The result of such a corporation's bias in favor of debt financing is an increase in the
risk of bankruptcy.
198
bb) Discouragement of Investments in the Corporate Sector
Identical to the debt equity argument, the presumption is made that equivalent pretax
returns can be earned no matter where an individual invests capital
199
The result that
returns to capital invested in the corporate sector bear a two level and therefore higher tax
burden than returns on investments in a non-incorporated business naturally leads to a bias
towards investing in non-incorporated enterprises.
197
According to Kwall. such a presumption is made in the legal literature, see id. at 643 n. 166. The
author refers to Warren, supra note 189. at 730-31.
198 Barton etal.. supra note 56, at 41; Jennifer Arlen. Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of
Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 329 (1995); U.S. Department of Treasury, Tax Reform for
Fairness. Simplicity, and Economic Growth, Vol 1. at 118-19 (1984).
199
See supra note 195.
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The following example illustrates the assertion, presuming that there is a pretax return
of 10 % and all income is taxed at a rate of 30 %. 200
Corporate Investment Non-corporate Investment
Amount invested $ 1,000 $ 1,000
Pretax return (10%) $ 100 $ 100
Corporate tax (30 %) $30 $0
Return net of corp tax $70 $ 100
Individual tax (30 %) $21 $30
Return net of indiv tax $49 $70
The legal literature presumes that the shareholders are the ones who eventually bear the
burden of the corporate tax.
201
Therefore the double taxation is a factor that discourages
individuals to invest in the corporate sector. By the way, the reasoning to support this
argument is identical with the reasoning used in the tax inequity argument.
20
cc) Corporations Will not Pursue Profitable Investment Opportunities
The argument that corporations will not pursue profitable investment opportunities
because of the double taxation issue is developed out of the 'debt versus equity' argument
First of all, it needs to be presumed that the ability to invest in a corporation's debt is
limited
203
and thus there are situations when the corporation is compelled to use equity
financing. If the investment is made in the equity of the corporation, as shown earlier the
cost of the capital is not deductible.
204
From a certain point on, the non-deductible cost of
the equity capital results in an overall loss for the investment. Such a loss only occurs
because of the non-deductibility of the equity cost in connection with the tax on the
200
See Kwall, supra note 29. at 642.
201




Warren, supra note 189, at 734-35.
204
See supra IV. B.l.b)aa).
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corporate level The same numbers as in the example under supra IV. B. 1 b)aa) (except the
percentage for the cost of capital) will be used to illustrate the different consequences.
Equity Finance Debt Finance
Amount invested $1,000 $ 1,000
Pretax gross return (10 %) $ 100 $ 100
Cost of capital (8%) $80 $80
Return net of cost of capital $20 $20
Corporate tax (30 %) $30 $6
Return net of tax ./. $10 $ 14
The 'certain point' in the example would be a cost of equity capital of 7 %. At that
percentage the return net tax would be 0. If the cost of equity exceeds the 7 %, the return
net of tax will be a negative number and therefore a loss. In the example, the cost of
capital exceeds 7 % (cost of capital is presumed to be 8 %). These numbers result in a loss
of $ 10, whereas the same investment would generate a profit of $ 14 (see column "Debt
Finance") if the cost of capital was deductible and thus not subject to corporate tax.
Under these circumstances, it can be concluded that the "corporation is likely to refrain
from undertaking that investment because its inability to deduct the cost of equity capital
would cause the corporation to suffer an after-tax loss from the investment,
notwithstanding the pretax profit."
206
c) Double Taxation and Administrative Complexity
According to parts of the legal literature, administrative complexity is one of the
disadvantages of the double taxation.
A tax system that is so complex that it is difficult to handle faces major problems,20




Kwall, supra note 29. at 645.
206 Mat 644.
2cr Adam Snath. Ax Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 778 (1937).
208
Taylor, supra note 1. at 246.
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double taxation in combination with the realization principle are the two main factors that
lead to the complexity of the present tax law system in the U.S.
209
The realization doctrine requires sale or other disposal of appreciated property as an
appropriate realization event.
210
The so realized gain is going to be subject to taxation
Besides the realization doctrine, there is another method of determining the amount of
income, commonly referred to as accretion model or Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of
income According to this definition, income is "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value
of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question"
211
The difference between
the two methods is that the accretion method includes the value of the appreciated
property to the extent of the appreciation in the current income, whereas the realization
method takes such appreciation into account only after the appropriate realization event.
Taylor gives a simple example to illustrate the accretion method:
212
"T, the taxpayer, has $ 1 million and spends it to buy at the beginning of the
year 10,000 shares of X Co. stock worth $ 1,000,000 ($ 100 per share). During
the year the stock pays $ 30,000 in dividends and increases in value to $
1,050,000 by the end of the year During the year, T spends $ 25,000 on
consumption (living expenses), leaving T with $ 5,000 in unspent cash at the end
of the year.
Under the accretion model, T has spend $ 25,000 on consumption Therefore,
part 1 of the equation is $ 25,000. T's increase in net worth, part 2 of the
formula, is $ 55,000, computed as follows:
Beginning net worth Ending net worth
Cash $1,000,000 $5,000
Stock 1.050,000
Total $ 1,000,000 $ 1,050,000
Difference (increase in net worth) = Ending net worth minus Beginning net




B.BlTTKER. L. LOKKEN. FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME. ESTATES AND GIFTS. Section 40. 1 (2d ed.
1990).
211 Henry Simons. Personal Income Taxation 50 (1938).
212
Taylor, supra note 1. at 248.
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Under the realization doctrine, only the dividend of $ 30,000 is income. The $ 50,000
stock appreciation will be considered as income after a realization event such as a sale or
exchange.
213
The focal point of the criticism is the variety of complex provisions contained in the
code which allow otherwise realized gain to go unrecognized and therefore untaxed.
214
There would be no need for such a sophisticated system if "an accretion model were
followed for the integrated taxation of individual shareholders."
215
At this point, three
issues regulated under the current corporate income tax law are specifically introduced as
examples for overly complex tax provisions.
First there is the issue of dividend and non-dividend distribution, which depends on




earnings and profits are complicated to determine since they are not necessarily identical
with the corporation's taxable income.
217
Section 302 IRC is another example for a
complex provision dealing with the question of dividend or non-dividend distribution
Redemption of stock (meaning the corporation's repurchase of some of its stock from its
shareholders) as a matter of form looks like a sale and therefore should trigger capital
gains treatment to the extent the purchase price exceeds the shareholder's adjusted basis.
Section 302 IRC regulates that proportionate distributions are to be treated like dividend
distributions, while the proportionality test is exceedingly complex, especially taking the
family and entity ownership attribution rules into account.
218
Another field of complexity is
213
Id. at 249 (Taylor describes the effect of the realization doctrine as "bunching huge amounts of income
around realization events", and he compares the realization model to "damming up a river" and the








Taylor, supra notel. at 251-52 ("[T]he corporations taxable income is adjusted to reflect those items
given special treatment under the tax law in a way that debates from financial accounting concepts."
Interest on certain bonds is for example not included in the corporation's gross income, whereas it




the issue of constructive dividends in connection with unreasonable compensation for
corporation's employees who happen to be shareholders at same time. Salaries paid by the
corporation are usually deductible as business expenses and reduce the corporation's
taxable income.
219
Under certain circumstances, the IRS can argue that unreasonable high
salaries are as a matter of substance dividend payments to the shareholders. Proving such
constructive dividends is factually complex.
220
Second there is the issue of corporate divisions and reorganizations. A corporate
division serves the purpose to divide a shareholder's investment in a single corporation
into an investment in two or even more corporations.
221
Such a division is regarded to
simply result in a "change in corporate structure with a retention of the business assets at
the corporate level, [and thus] the rationale justifying nonrecognition of gain or loss in
section 368 (a) (1) [IRC] reorganizations is applicable."
222
At the same time, if as a matter
of substance the distribution resembles a dividend, there are rules denying the tax free
treatment,
22
' and producing at the same time a huge amount of complexity.
224
One
example for such a complex rule is section 355 (a) (1) (B) IRC, stating that the division
cannot be used as a device to distribute earnings and profits, which is the case if there is a
valid business purpose other than the avoidance of federal income tax at both the
corporate and the shareholder level.
225
The same degree of complexity can be found in corporate reorganizations.
226
Although
corporate reorganizations involve huge potential tax consequences (corporations' assets
and shareholders' stock are likely to contain unrealized and therefore yet untaxed
219
See section 162 (a) (1) IRC.
220
See Home Interiors & Gifts. Inc. v. Commissioner. 73 T.C 1 142 (1980).




See section 355 IRC; Treas. Reg. 1.355-1 through 1.355-5; Rev. Proc. 86-41. 1986-2 C.B. 716
224
Taylor, supra note 1. at 255.
225
Treas. Reg. 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii) (The corporate business purpose for the transaction is evidence of
nonde\ice.)
226





appreciation), the transaction is not taxed if it qualifies for reorganization treatment as
provided in sections 368 (a) (1) (A)-(C); 354 (a); 361 (a) IRC. In addition to the
requirements stated in the provisions, there are the judicially developed prerequisites of a
business purpose, a continuity of interest and the continuity of enterprise.
227
If one or
more of these prerequisites are not met, both the corporation and the shareholders will be
taxed on their realized gain.
228
Third there are the rules concerning accumulated earnings and personal holding
companies. The provisions of the accumulated earnings tax are fairly complex because of
the "reasonable business needs" prerequisite
22 By careful planning (the plan on
substantial expansion in the near future) the corporation can avoid the application of the
accumulated earnings provisions.
230
The complex personal holding company tax
231
can
also be avoided (the corporations have to produce ample amounts of income that does not
qualify as personal holding company income). Since well advised individuals can avoid
both penalty taxes, these taxes are "essentially a trap for the unwary".
232
d) Tax Integration as a Form of Relief to Double Taxation
Critics of the double taxation consider integration of corporate and shareholder taxes as
a appropriate solution to make sure that corporate earnings are ultimately taxed identically
to earnings in non-corporate form.
233
Integration leads to the elimination or at least the
227
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Treas. Reg. 1.368-l(d); Barton etal., supra note 56. at
366, 383-418.
228
Section 1001 (c) IRC.
229
Taylor, supra note 1, at 257; For more details see supra III.A.d)bb)
230
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303-06 (1969).
231
For details see supra III. A.d)aa).
232
Taylor, supra note 1, at 258.
233 American Law Institute, Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax Integration (1993); U.S.
Treasury Dept., A Recommendation for Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax
Systems (1992); U.S. Treasury Dept., Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration
of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems-Taxing Business Income Once (1992); George K.
Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TaxL. Rev. 431 (1992);
Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully not at all), 47 TaxL. Rev. 509 (1992);
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mitigation of the double taxation of corporate earnings.
2,4
The various possible
mechanisms of integration can be divided into basically three groups, i.e. shareholder-level
responses to the receipt of dividends, corporate-level responses to the distribution of
dividends, and the allocation of all corporate earnings no matter whether retained or
distributed among the shareholders. 23 The first two groups are also referred to as
dividend relief methods, since they only reduce double taxation on distributed earnings,
whereas the last group is labeled complete integration method which eliminates double
taxation of both dividends and retained corporate earnings.
236
The shareholder-level response can take the form of an exclusion from income,
237
an
offsetting deduction against shareholder income, or a credit against shareholder taxes.
The corporate-level response can take the form of allowing corporations to deduct
parts or all of their dividend payments to mitigate double taxation by distributing their
profits. Another possibility is to tax the part of the corporate income that is distributed at a
lower rate.
As described in the previous chapter, the German tax law provides double tax relief by
a combination of a shareholder-level and a corporate level response, having a split tax rate
on the corporate level and allowing the shareholder to use the tax paid on the corporate
level as a credit against his individual tax liability.
Hugh J. Ault. Corporate Integration. Tax Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base. 47 Tax
L. Rev. 565 (1992); Emil M. Sunley. Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective. 47 TaxL. Rev.
621 (1992); Pechman. supra note 3. at 179-89; Warren, supra note 189; McLure. supra note 189.
234 Barton et al.. supra note 56. at 40.
235
Kahn. Lehman, supra note 47. at 31.
236





Sess., at 84-88 (1989); Lorence L. Bravenec. A Nontraditional Approach to
Corporate Integration. 44 T.ax Notes 1381 (1989).
23 The Treasury Department recommends the exclusion from income because of the simplification
concerns over any form of the imputation credit method. Under the dividend exclusion method, the
shareholders exclude dividends from income because such dividends are already taxed on the corporate
level. This provides huge integration benefits and requires little structural change in the IRC. See U.S.
Treasury Department, supra note 233. at \ii-x.
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2. Supporting Criticism of the Double Taxation
Criticism of the double taxation is based on the arguments that its consequences violate
the tax policy principles of having an equitable and efficient tax system Supporters of the
present double taxation system add in addition to the two major tax principles a third
element to the discussion, which is the requirement that the tax system has to raise a given
amount of revenue.
238
The legal literature as a critic of the system fails to consider this
requirement.
239
Supporters state that the realistic reform goal is "to minimize on a system-
wide basis the adverse impact on equity and efficiency of a tax system required to generate
a given amount of revenue."
240
Since the repeal of the double taxation would lead to a
substantial loss of revenue,
241
the missing amount of money has to be collected somewhere
else
The question now is whether the previously under IV B 1 discussed gains in equity and
efficiency outweigh the negative impact that the need of utilizing an alternative revenue
source has on the tax policy principles.
According to the supporters of the double taxation, a tax reform repealing double
taxation would have the following negative impact on tax equity and efficiency Presuming
that individuals with high incomes have a tendency to invest their wealth in stock and
receive a high proportion of the dividend income they are the ones benefiting from
238
Kwall. supra note 29. at 615.
239
Id. ; See e.g. Klein. The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in
Economics. 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 576.578-79 ("Similarly disturbing is the opinion offered by some experts
. . that the corporate tax can be defended on the ground that it is a good source of revenue - a \iew that .
apparently is based upon some well concealed antidemocratic value judgments."
)
240
Feldstein. On the Theory of Tax Reform. 6 J. Pub. Econ. 77. 98-102 (1976); Kwall. supra note 29. at
616.
241
Robert J.Leonard. A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration. 42 Tax Notes 889. 894 (\9%l)£.g. the
Treasury estimated that its own 1984 proposal to deduct half of the dmdends paid to shareholders would
lead to a $ 38 billion revenue loss for the fiscal year of 1990. see 1 Treasi-ry Dept Report. Tax
Reform for Fairness. Simplicity, and Economic Growth 248 (1984); see also Brady Offers Sermon
on Capital Gains Cut and Corporate Integration to the Converted. 44 Tax Notes 1311 (1989) (Treasury




To make up the loss in revenue without altering the allocation of the tax
burdens among income classes, higher income classes must be taxed at a higher tax rate.
243
Such a change in law would distract the equity principle because higher tax rates increase
the differences in tax liability between individuals who pay taxes on their entire income and
similarly situated individuals who can take advantage of tax preferences to lower their tax
liability.
244
The efficiency principle would be effected since the higher tax rates "would
increase the desirability of those economic alternatives that exploit tax preferences and
thereby augments the extent to which the tax system distorts economic decisions."
245
After
all, to increase the tax rate in order to compensate for the revenue loss due to the repeal of
the double taxation causes more distraction to the tax principles of equity and efficiency
than the present state of the law.
C. Results of the German Tax Reform of 1977
On the occasion of the ten year anniversary of the German corporate tax reform, legal
experts and scholars generally evaluated the reform and commented on how far the reform
succeeded in fulfilling the government's objectives.
246
242 American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter C, Proposals on
Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on Corporate Distributions 328
(1982) (Integration 'would only be accomplished at a substantial cost in . . . progressivity, since a high
proportion of dividends flow to high income, wealthy individuals"; Joint Comm. on Taxation, Federal
Income Tax Aspects of Corporate Financial Structures 57 (1989) ("High tax rat taxpayers will tend
to concentrate their wealth in the form of equity"); Kwall, supra note 29 at 618 n. 16, n. 107).
243
Kwall proves this point by referring to economists who came to the conclusion that the elimination of
double taxation in a revenue-neutral manner connect an increase in individual income tax rates to
integration. See Kwall, supra note 29, at 617 n. 18; Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income
Taxation. 86 J. Pol. Econ. 29, 46-48 (1978); Fullerton et al., Corporate Tax Integration in the United
States: A General Equilibrium Approach, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 677, 683-90 (1981).
244
Kwall, supra note 29, at 617, 633-41.
245
Id. at 617. 645-56
246
E.g. Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk. Bilanz der Koerperschaftsteuer-Reform 1977, Was ist erreicht, was bleibt
zu tun? [Stud)' on the corporate tax reform of 1977, What is accomplished, what still needs to be done?]
GmbH-Rundschau [GmbHR] 125 (1987); Klaus Brezing. Die Behandlung auslaendischer Einkuenfte und
steuerfreier inlaendischer Einnahmen, Derfundamental Fehler im KStG 1977 [Treatment of foreign
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1. Objective of Spreading the Stock Ownership
One major political goal of the reform was to increase the attraction of investments in
the corporate sector for individuals with lower income and thus spread the ownership of
the means of production among more individuals.
247
The tax reform did not fulfill this
goal. The portion of the private household's wealth invested in stocks declined even
further after the tax reform. This can be concluded according to the study from
Haegert/Lehleiter
249
and the study from Iber.
250
Haegert/Lehleiter came up with the
following table:
Wealth of private households in billion DM






































The result of Iber' s study backs up the conclusion that can be drawn from the previous
table. He determined the structure of stock ownership in the time frame 1963 till 1983,
shown in the following table:





Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 246, at 130.
249
Haegert/Lehleiter, ZfbF 37 (1985).
50
Iber, Zur Entwicklung der Aktionaersstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1963-1983) [About
the development of the structure of shareholders in Germany (1963-1983)], ZfB Vol.55. 1101 (1985).
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Structure of stock-ownership (in %)
Year 1963 1973 1983
Private Households 26 24.3 16.7
Foreign investors 15.5 10 8.3
Public administration 13.5 10 8 9.5
Banks 6.1 7.8 7.7
Insurance companies 4 4.3 7.2
Businesses 35 42.8 50.6
Both tables show that the tax reform failed to serve as an incentive for private
households to increase investing in the corporate sector. The main reason for this fact is
that although dividends are no longer burdened by two levels of tax, there always remains
the risk of falling stock prices.
251
2. Objective to Remove the Disadvantages of Equity Financing
The tax reform succeeded in repealing the preferential corporate tax treatment of debt
financing compared to equity financing.
25
However, the corporation's costs for
investments in its equity are still higher than the costs for investments in its debt.
253 One
factor is the German net asset tax. Corporations as well as shareholders are both tax
subjects under the net asset tax.
254
Equity is part of the tax object of the net asset tax
Once a corporation distributes dividends, such dividends are subject to the net asset tax on
the shareholder level. The net asset tax does not provide an imputation system as it is
regulated in the corporate tax code. Therefore, a corporation's equity capital is still
subject to double taxation under the net asset tax. A second factor is the German trade
tax. The trade tax discriminates equity financing because of preferential treatment for a
corporation's long term debt and the interest it has to pay on long term debts, see sections
8 No 1, 12 (2) No 1 Trade Tax Code
251






The government was well aware of these factors, since it predicted them in the
materials explaining the reasons for the reform
255
The government was also of the opinion
that already a substantial decrease in the costs for equity capital will eventually lead to an
improvement of the corporations capital structure.
254
Crezelius. supra note 148. at 360.
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3. Objective to Improve the Neutrality of Corporate Tax Law
The tax reform of 1977 failed to establish a perfectly neutral corporate tax system.
25
However, the government never intended such a comprehensive reform The
government's objective for the reform was limited from the start to abolish the economic
double burden on distributed corporate earnings.
25
' The reform accomplished this goal
although it needs to be mentioned that to this extend it was a rather technical matter. Still,
tax issues are of extreme importance when it comes to making the decision whether to
chose the corporate or the partnership form to conduct business. In 1987 the three major
issues were the allowance only for corporations to build reserves for a pension fund tax
free, the allowance only for corporations to use the management salaries as a deduction in
the process of determining the German trade tax liability
251
and the advantage for
corporations that only half of the long term debts and half of the interest on such long
term debts were burdened with the German trade tax.
259
At that time, partnerships were
not eligible for such preferential tax treatment.
A detailed analysis of the just mentioned tax issues is beyond the scope of this thesis,
but their mentioning serves the purpose to make the following point: Changing the
corporate and the individual income tax law from a two tier to a one tier tax system does
not cause the overall tax system to be of perfect neutrality There are too many other tax
issues inducing certain behaviors that respond to after-tax effects.
256
Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk. Aktuelle Probleme des mittelstaendischen Unternehmens. Steurberater-
Jahrbuch [Current Problems of Midsize Businesses, in Yearbook of the Professional Tax
Consultants], 127. 141-42 (1988).
257
Knobbe-Keuk. supra note 246. at 132.
258
Trade Tax is the municipal business tax based on profits and capital, see Ernst & Ernst. West
Germany; A Digest of Principal Taxes. 14 (1970).
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Knobbe-Keuk. supra note 246. at 132.
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4. Summary
After the tax reform of 1977, there is technically no longer a double tax burden on
dividends distributed by a corporation. However, the reform did not trigger the effects to
the extent that the government expected and hoped for. It is true that aspect of taxing
distributed dividends twice is no longer an issue when it comes to the question which form
of enterprise should be used to conduct a business. Moreover, the tax reform led to a
decrease of the corporation's cost for equity financing. This is due to the implementation
of the imputation procedure in the 1 977 tax reform.
However, the tax reform of 1977 cannot be blamed for falling short of the expectations.







The legal literature in the United States agrees on criticizing the double taxation of
distributed corporate earnings on three grounds as producing inequity, economic
inefficiency and administrative complexity. If limited to the scope of the general tax
principles of equity and efficiency, the assessment of the double taxation as the present
state of the corporate tax law comes to the reasonable conclusion that such tax principles
are distorted. However, the legal literature intentionally disregards the fact that these two
tax principles are not the only means of measurement to evaluate tax provisions. In
addition, the purpose of taxation which is to raise a given amount of revenue needs to be
taken into account. Critics simply ignore this circumstance.
261
As long as only the tax
principles are considered, it seems that by technically calculating the numbers it can be
proved that any of the integration methods will lead to a more equitable and efficient tax
system. This approach loses its appeal once it is realized that tax law has the indispensable
function to raise revenue. So far, the legal literature failed to counter the presumption that
a repeal of double taxation will most likely lead to an increase of federal income tax rates
to make up for the loss in revenue, and that such a subsequent step would result in an even
greater distortion of the equity and efficiency tax principles.
The experiences gained from the German tax reform of 1 977 are that the repeal of the
double taxation was only one step in the direction towards a more neutral and thus
efficient tax system This is due to the fact that in deciding whether the corporate or the
non-corporate form should be chosen to conduct one's business, there are many more tax
261
E.g. see Taylor, supra note 1. at 310. He concludes: The largest obstacle hindering ecactment of an
integration plan is the looming federal deficit. If an integration plan actually increased revenue, then the
likelihood of its passage would be very favorable Unfortunately, most integration plans produce
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issues to be considered than only the question of how distributed corporate dividends are
taxed. As a consequence of the German tax reform of 1977, the economical double burden
on distributed dividends does no longer exist. This was achieved by implementing the
'imputation procedure' in the corporate tax law. However, abolishing the double tax
burden was rather a technical matter that could have been accomplished in many different
ways, as the number of suggestions for integration methods indicates. It is therefore more
important to point out that the tax reform fell short in fulfilling the government's major
objectives to create a corporate tax law that eventually leads to a wider spread of stock
ownership among the population and that the reform was only one step into the direction
towards a system that no longer favors investments financed with debt over investments
financed with equity.
Experiences gained from the German tax reform of 1977 lead to the conclusion that a
reform focusing exclusively on the abolishment of the economic double tax burden on
distributed corporate income is not capable of automatically leading to a more efficient
and equitable tax system.
In addition to these experiences, the United States have to take into consideration the
lack of revenue as a consequence of such a reform and so necessary counter actions that
need to be taken to make up for such a deficit. Such counter actions are likely to be a raise
of tax rates in other tax areas, which can be considered another major distortion of the tax
principles equity and efficiency.
Taking all these observations into account, the thesis concludes that a tax reform that
will abolish the two level taxation of distributed corporate income cannot be justified with
the argument that the reform will lead to a more efficient and equitable tax system.
moderate to large losses in revenue. The author's proposal does not attempt to respond to any of these
budget deficit difficulties.*' (Emphasis added).
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